"Infrastructure Investment for Tomorrow, A Financing Plan to Eliminate the Deferred Maintenance on the Nation's Roads" by Edward V. Regan




A  Financing  Plan  to  Eliminate 
the  Deferred  Maintenance  on 
the  Nation’s  Roads 
Edwwd V.  Regm The  Jerome  l.evy  Economics  Institute  of 
%ard  College,  founded  in  1986,  is  an  au- 
tonomous,  independently  endowed  research 
organization.  It  is  nonpartisan,  open  to  the 
examination  of  diverse  points  of  view,  and 
dedicated  to  public  service. 
The  Institute  believes  in  the  potential  for  the 
study  of  economics  to  improve  the  human 
condition.  Its  purpose  is  to  generate  viable, 
effective  public  policy  responses  to  important 
economic  problems.  It  is  concerned  with  issues 
that  profoundly  affect  the  quality  of  life  in  the 
United  Sates  and  abroad. 
The  present  research  agenda  includes  such 
issues  as  financial  instability,  poverty,  unem- 
ployment,  and  problems  associated  with  the 
distribution  of  income  and  wealth.  Other 
research  interests  include  the  issues  of  public 
and  private  investment  and  their  relationship 
to  product-ivity,  competitiveness,  and  the 
prospects  for  growth  and  employment.  In  all 
its  endeavors,  the  Institute  places  heavy 
emphasis  on  the  values  of  personal  freedom 
and  justice. 
Editor:  Sanjay  Mongia 
As&ate  Eiiitors:  Tberew  Ford,  Frances  Spring 
A  publication  of The  Jermne  Levy  Ecxmomics  Institute  of Bard  College,  Post  Office  Box  5000, 
Annand&-on-Hudson,  NY  1250+5000. 
P&c  Poliq  Brkfh  produced  by  the  Bard  College  Publications  CMice: Ginger  Shore,  Directq  Elena 
Ertxr,  Art  Driwtoq  Judith  Kahn,  Text  Editor;  Juliet  &II,  Assistant  An  Dkcto~,  Sanford  Kobinson, 
Assockxe Text  Editor;  Lisa Tmger,  I?&gwr:  Cathy  Ruggiero,  Pr&ction  Assistant. 
@3  Cqyright  1994  by The  Jemmc  Levy  Economics  hwitute.  All  rights  resered.  No  part  of  this  publica- 
tion  may  be  mpmdw.cd  or  transmitted  in  any  form  or by  any  means,  electronic  or  mechanical,  includiw 
photocopying,  maxding,  or  any  informaticm~retrievnl  .qv.tem,  without  permirmun  in  witing  from  the 
publisher. 
The  Jerome  J_.evy Economics  Institute  is  publishing  this  Public  Policy  Brief, 
without  necessarily  endorsing  its  proposals,  to  make  a  consnuctive  contribu- 




Dimitri  B.  Pa&UIimit?iou  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 
A  Financing  Plan  to  Eliminate 
the  Deferred  Maintenance  on 
the  Nation’s  Roads 
I3lw&  V.  Regan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
About  the  Author  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Preface 
Hardly  a  day  passes  without  a  media  report 
about  the  poor  and  deteriorating  condition  of 
the  nation’s  infrastructure.  Long  traffic  jams 
and  travel  delays  due  to  reconstruction  and 
repair  along  the  nation’s  highways  havre 
become  commonplace.  Firsthand  experience 
has  led  many  Americans  to  believe  that  the 
country’s  infrastructure  network,  if  not  in 
chronic  disrepair,  is at  least  inadequate. 
In  this  P&c  Poiicy  Brief,  Edward  V.  Regan, 
who  formerly  served  as  a  city  councilman  in 
Buffalo,  chief  executive  of  an  urban  county, 
and  chief  fiscal  officer  of  New  York  State, 
confronts  the  problem  of  inadequate  mainte- 
nance  and  upkeep  of  the  country’s  vast  net- 
work  of  roads,  bridges,  and  highways.  He 
declares  that  deficiencies  in  the  state  of  the 
nation’s  infrastructure  have  impeded  the  effi+ 
cient  flow  of  information,  goods,  and  people 
so  essential  in  a  modern  economy.  Regan’s 
paper  is  a  compendium  on  infrastructure-the 
result  of  his  extensive  research  and  a  thorough 
analysis  of  hundreds  of  relevant  sources, 
including  works  in  progress. 
The  Levy  Institute  has  a  rich  background  in 
the  topic  of  public  investment,  especially  in 
infrastructure,  as  a  means  to  enhance  produce 
tivity,  growth,  and  the  nation’s  long-term  eco- 
nomic  competitiveness.  In  June  1992,  we 
organized  a  major  policy  conference  on  the 
role  of  public  capital  in  stimulating  employ- 
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ment  and  fostering  growth.  Subsequently,  the  Institute  published  two  P&ic 
Policy  Briefs,  including  the  seminal  research  of  David  A.  Aschauer,  that 
tackle  the  subjects  of  (1)  the  broad  relationships  between  public  infrastruc- 
ture  and  economic  growth,  and  the  merits  of  public  investment  in  an  envi- 
ronment  of  scarce  economic  resources,  and  (2)  the  specific  link  between 
public  infrastructure  and  private  sector  equipment  investment. 
In  addition,  a  preliminary  version  of  the  novel  financing  plan  described  in 
this  Brief  was  outlined  by  S  Jay  Levy  and  David  A.  Levy  in  a  January  1992 
paper  entitled  tiHow  to  Restore  Long-Term  Prosperity  in  the  United  States 
and  Overcome  the  Contained  Depression  of  the  1990s.”  The  bipartisan 
Competitiveness  Policy  Council,  in  its  May  1994  report,  “Promoting  Long- 
Term  Prosperity,”  endorsed  a  modest  program  of  strategic  public  infrastructure 
investment,  with  particular  interest  in  redressing  the  propensity  of  states  and 
municipalities  to  defer  maintenance. 
Regan’s  proposal  has  several  components,  all  of  independent  significance  and 
merit.  They  weave  together  into  a  public  investment  program  consisting  of  a 
one-time  renovation  that  addresses  the  nation’s  infrastructure  maintenance 
needs.  He  tackles  the  continuing  practice  of  deferred  maintenance  by 
proposing  the  use  of  court-enforceable  bond  covenants  that  would  require 
mayors  and  governors  to  maintain,  according  to  professional  standards,  the 
upgraded  infrastructure.  Thus,  he  avoids  the  political  trap  that  often  con- 
fronts  public  capital  programs-politicians  more  inclined  to  authorize  new 
construction  projects  fat  the  media  attention  they  will  attract  than  to  appto- 
priate  funds  for  very  necessary,  but  unglamorous  but  maintenance  work. 
The  proposal  herein  is  also  sensitive  to  the  national  mood  of  fiscal  responsi- 
b&y,  which  measures  the  merits  of  nearly  all  public  programs  by  their  effects 
on  the  federal  budget  deficit  and  national  debt.  Because  the  plan  relies  on 
bond  financing  and  a  minimal  federal  subsidy  to  cover  the  interest  payable 
on  the  taxable  bonds,  the  modest  financial  impact  of  the  program  can  be 
abso&d  over  a  much  Ionget  span,  .say 15  Yeats,  tathet  than  a  one-time  lump 
sum  hit  on  the  federal  budget. 
There  is  little  disagreement  ovet  the  inadequate  condition  of  the  nation’s 
infrastructure,  and  the  need  to  improve  the  stock  of  this  vital  national  resource 
to  enhance  the  competitive  position  of  the  U.S.  economy  in  the  twenty-first 
century.  This  proposal  promotes  that  essential  long-term  objective  hy  provid- 
ing  a  meaningful  and  feasible  vehicle  to  improve  America’s  infrastructure. 
Dimitri  B.  Papadimimiou 
Executiw  Director 
November  1994 
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I.  introduction 
In  the  course  of  my  campaign  for  the 
Buffalo  City  Council  in  1965,  I  met  hun- 
dreds  of  voters,  many  of  whom  complained 
about  potholes,  structurally  deficient  bridges 
and  viaducts,  and  other  infrastructure  prob- 
lems  that  plagued  the  city.  I  would  jot  down 
the  information,  stuff  the  notes  in  my 
pocket,  and  promise  to  look  into  it  if 
elected.  My  campaign  was  successful,  and 
shortly  after  I  took  office  the  council  held 
its  annual  budget  hearings.  As  the  depart- 
ment  heads  appeared  to  speak  for  their 
appropriations,  I  fished  out  the  notes  I  had 
taken  and  started  questioning  the  DOT 
chief  and  the  head  of  Public  Works  about 
the  condition  of  the  bridges  and  streets. 
During  a  recess,  a  long-term  council  mem- 
ber,  Joe  Dudzick,  gave  me  a  lesson  that  has 
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never  left  me,  and  which  I  often  repeat.  “Kid,”  he  said,  “what’s  all  this 
viaduct  and  bridge  stuff?” 
With  freshman  earnest  I  recounted  the  hardships  of  the  residents  and 
appealed  for  the  merits  of  the  projects. 
“Kid,”  Joe  explained,  “you’re  talking  about  the  ‘operation  and  mainte- 
nance’  budget,  where  every  buck  spent  is  an  instant  buck  of  taxes.” 
“Well,  what  do  you  do?”  I  asked, 
“Let  it  slide,”  he  said.  “When  conditions  deteriorate,  that  calls  for  a 
major  overhaul,  which  is  funded  out  of  the  capital  budget,  where  a  buck 
of  expenditures  is  only  five  cents  in  taxe.+because  you  can  borrow.” 
A  light  bulb  went  off  in  my  head.  The  second  flash  quickly  followed. 
“Besides,”  this  veteran  of  many  successful  campaigns  said,  “it’s  a  joke  to 
think  that  a  newspaper  reporter  or  TV  crew  would  ever  notice  a  bridge 
being  scraped  and  painted.  What  has  to  happen  is  the  bridge  falls  down, 
you  go  with  the  mayor  when  he  cuts  the  ribbon  to  open  the  new  bridge, 
and  you’ll  be  on  the  6  o’clock  news  getting  the  credit.” 
Some  20  years  later,  on  June  11,  1988,  New  York.  City’s  Mayor  Ed  Koch, 
flanked  by  camera  crews  and  reporters,  raised  his  arms  in  a  victory  sign  as 
he  stood  on  an  elevated  train  platform  on  the  Williamsburg  Bridge  and 
announced  the  restoration  of  subway  service  on  the  newly  reopened 
bridge.  Two  months  earlier,  in  April  1988,  the  Williamsburg  Bridge  had 
been  shut  down  when  inspectors  found  corrosion  so  extensive  that  they 
feared  the  collapse  of  the  bridge.  The  closing  of  the  bridge  inconve- 
nienced  240,000  daily  commutcm,  cost  business  in  the  Lower  East  Side 
an  80  percent  drop  in  revenues,  and  required  an  immediate  infusion  of 
millions  of  dollars  for  bridge  repairs. 
According  to  subsequent  commission  reports,  the  blame  for  the  failure  of 
the  Williamsburg  Bridge  was  easy  enough  to  pinpoint: 
a  lack  of  simple  preventative  maintenance  such  as  regular  cleaning  of 
expansion  plates  has  led  to  earthquake-like  cracks  in  the  abutment  .  .  . 
and  shifting  of  the  concrete-bearing  pedestals;  a  combination  of  salt, A  Fhancing  Plun  to  Eliminate  he  Deferred  Muintenmce  on  he  Nution’s  Rod 
water  leakage,  and  lack  of  regular  painting  is  responsible  for  the  corro- 
sion  of  structural  steel  members;  .  .  .  and  a  lack  of  frequent  monitoring 
can  be  blamed  for  the  recent  failure  to  identify  a  weak  portion  of  the 
outer  roadway  grating,  which  fell  into  the  East  River.  . . .’ 
Penny-wise  and  pound-foolish.  In  the  mid-198Os,  the  city  of  New  York 
was  spending  approximately  $8  million  annually  on  repair  and  mainte- 
nance  for  its  8%  bridges.  By  contrast,  the  Trihorough  Bridge  and  Tunnel 
Authority  spent  $20  million  in  1985  to  maintain  its  seven  bridges  and 
two  tunnels.  Rut  the  taxpayers  ultimately  paid  dearly  for  the  city’s  pol- 
icy.  According  to  analysts,  it  would  cost  nearly  three  times  as  much  to 
repair  the  WilLmshurg  Bridge  as  it  would  have  cost  to  maintain  it  prop- 
erly  over  the  years. 
While  dramatic,  the  Williamsburg  Bridge  is  not  an  atypical  example  of 
Jot  Dudzick’s  insights  at  work.  There  are  strong  incentives  throughout 
our  system  to  defer  maintenance.  Over  the  years,  many  people  have 
heen  trouhled  hy  these  perverse  incentives  and  have  tried  various  meth- 
ods  of  solving  the  problem.  After  countless  discussions  with  experts  who 
are  well  grounded  in  the  issues-state  and  local  government  officials, 
community  leaders  and  activists,  academics,  and  financiers-l  have 
developed  the  proposal  outlined  in  this  paper  as  an  alternative  approach. 
Its  unique  features,  detailed  in  this  paper,  are  designed  to  address  some  of 
the  long-standing  problems  in  this  area. 
Fortunately,  several  factors  have  converged  to  make  this  moment  ripe 
for  action.  Over  a  period  of  years,  some  memhers  of  Congress  have 
grown  increasingly  reluctant  to  hand  out  more  funds  for  new  construc- 
tion  when  existing  infrastructure  was  not  being  looked  after.  The 
Intcrmodal  Surface  Transportation  Efficiency  Act  (ISTEA)  of  1991  was 
one  reflection  of  that  sentiment,  encouraging  states  to  take  maintenance 
activities  seriously,  with  the  threat  of  penalties  to  states  that  do  not 
comply.  Some  sates  have  hegun  to  address  their  own  problems,  and 
some  are  turning  the  tables  on  their  own  local  jurisdicrions,  encouraging 
public  scrutiny  of  the  performance  of  localities.  Gradually,  hoth  cities 
and  states  are  coming  to  the  realization  that  the  hills  for  unfunded  main- 
tenance  are  long  overdue  and  that  the  practice  of  “deferred  mainte- 
nance”  adds  nothing  to  the  asset  side  of  the  halance  sheet-in  fact,  it  is 
an  enormous  economic  and  fiscal  liability.  Also  at  this  time,  public  and 
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the  communities  where  their  workers  live  and  retire. 
Finally,  at  the  federal  level,  as  part  of  the  debate  on  deficit  spending, 
there  is  renewed  interest  in  directing  our  nation’s  resources  away  from 
spending  for  immediate  consumption  and  toward  sound  long-term 
investments.  All  of  these  factors  may  provide  the  motivation  to  put  an 
end  to  old  ways  of  managing  the  nation’s  infrastructure. 
At  the  end  of  the  twentieth  century,  the  country  faces  both  the  opportu~ 
nity  and  the  need  for  an  infusion  of  investment  to  preserve  and  upgrade 
our  existing  infrastructure.  Such  investments,  judiciously  chosen,  have 
the  potential  for  immediate  economic  improvements  in  many  communi- 
ties,  while  laying  the  groundwork  for  increased  productivity  for  the 
future.  Our  goal  should  be  an  infrastructure  system  in  good  working 
order,  capable  of  meeting  the  needs  of  the  twentyfirst  century. 
Backpound 
The  govemmcnt-owned  infrastructure  in  the  United  States  forms  a  vast, 
pervasive  network  of  constructed  facilities  accumulated  over  a  period  of 
centuries  and  used  daily  by  virtually  every  American.  In  dollar  terms,  the 
value  of  this  infrastructur~onsisting  of  the  nonmilitary  stock  of  physic 
cal  structures  and  equipment-was  placed  at  nearly  $2.2  trillion  in 
1990.’  Nearly  two-thirds  of  that  amount  is  in  the  form  of  core  infrastruc- 
ture,  including  highways  and  bridges,  mass  transit,  airports,  water  and 
sewer  systems,  and  government-owned  electric  and  gas  utilities. 
Despite  the  vasmess  of  the  public  capital,  its  value  has  been  falling  in 
relation  to  the  overall  economy-from  a  postwar  high  of  49  percent  of 
GDP  in  1970  to  a  postwar  low  of  41  percent  in  1990.’  As  has  been 
extensively  reported,  the  rate  of  public  investment  in  infrastructure 
slowed  considerably  over  the  same  twenty-year  period.  Between  1980 
and  1990,  federal  spending  on  infrastructure  fell  from  4.7  percent  of  all 
federal  outlays  to  2.5  percent:  There  are  several  reasons  for  this  slow- 
down,  including  demographic  changes,  rapidly  escalating  social  and 
health  spending,  the  completion  of  the  interstate  system,  budget  cut- 
backs,  and  the  faihrre  of  dedicated  motor  vehicle  fuel  taxes  to  keep  up 
with  inflation.  While  vehicle  miles  of  travel  grew  more  than  40  percent 
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between  1983  and  1990,  cap&al  investment  in  highways  in  1991  was  at 
about  the  same  level  (in  constant  dollars)  as  in  1965.’ 
In  recent  years,  a. steady  stream  of  reports  on  the  state  of  the  nation’s 
infrastructure  has  focused  on  deteriorations  in  the  quality  of  existing 
infrastructure  and  the  need  to  preserve  the  system  (see  “Findings  from 
Recent  ReporLq” on  the  next  page).  Although  environmental  and  other 
infrastructure  areas  arc  also  in  need  of  attention,  transportation  has  been 
the  primary  focus  of  those  reports,  as  it  is  of  this  one.  A  series  of  roundta- 
bles  convened  in  late  1993  by  the  U.S.  Department  of  Transportation 
(DOT)  in  each  region  of  the  country  reported: 
From Hartford  to  Seattle,  DOT  was  reminded  that  it  will  do  little  good 
to  develop  a  world  class  tmnspo~ta~ion  system  if  we  cannot  maintain 
what  we  already  have.  .  .  .  DOT  officials  were  told  that  existing  infra- 
structure  is  in  dite  need  of  repair  and  that  this  problem  affects  every 
township  and  county  in  the  nation.6 
Federal  grants  for  transportation  infmstructure  have  been  skewed  toward 
new  investment  at  the  expense  of  maintenance  and  upkeep  of  the  exist- 
ing  capital  stock.  In  the  past,  new  capital  projects  typically  were  funded 
hy  the  federal  government  at  a  higher  matching  ratio  than  preservation; 
preventive  maintenance  was  typically  ineligible  for  federal  funding 
entirely.  The  disparity  in  eligibility  and  matching  ratios  created  yet 
another  disincentive  for  states  to  perform  preventive  maintenance,  since 
deteriorating  systems  ultimately  became  eligible  for  federal  funding  for 
reconstruction. 
Even  today,  when  preventive  maintenance  on  the  Interstate  Highway 
System  is  eligible  for  federal  funds,  states  are  unable  or  reluctant  to  use 
federal  funds  for  maintenance,  preferring  to  spend  the  money  on  capital 
projects  instead.i  Facing  continuing  shortfalls  in  funding,  states  and 
localities  often  manage  maintenance  as  the  activity  of  last  resort. 
Preventive  maintenance  funds  are  lumped  together  with  other  mainte- 
nance  items  in  the  budget,  and  preventive  measures  are  often  under- 
taken  only  as  time  permits. 
The  Strategic  Highway  Research  Program  of  the  National  Research 
Council  noted,  “Given  the  low  priority  that  pavement  maintenance  may 
receive  from  the  very  agencies  that  perform  it,  it  is  not  surprising  that 
first-year  fa.iIures  of  pavement  repairs  are  quite  common,  and  that  the 
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Findings  from  Recent  Reports 
“The  Council  encourages  renewed  attention  at  every  level  of  govern- 
ment  to  maintaining  our  current  assets  to  optimum  standards. 
Maintenance  is  perhais  the  single  most  important  element  of  gov- 
ernmen&’  stewardship  obligation.  It  also  is  the  element  that  is  easis 
est  to  defer,  and  the  one  most  likely  to  be  cut  from  the  current 
expense  budget.” 
National  Council  on  Public  Works  Improvement,  Fragik  Foudxi~ms: 
A  Report  on  Arneri~~‘s  P&&k  Works,  Februa~  1988 
“ .  .  .  [Mluch  of  the  basic  transportation  infrastructure  has  been  in 
place  for  at  least  20  to  40  years-long  enough  to  need  substantial 
repair  or  rehabilitation,  especially  in  heavily  traveled  corridors.  In 
jurisdictions  where  maintenance  has  been  neglected,  deteriorated  and 
congested  rail,  highway,  water,  and  air  facilities  slow  travel,  hinder 
national  productivity,  and  increase  costs  .  .  .  The  1990s  .  ,  .  loom  as  a 
pivotal  decade  for  public  works.  Squeezed  by  demands  for  every  con- 
ceivable  type  of  public  service,  State  and  local  officials  have  post- 
poned  routine  maintenance  and  rehabilitation  of  vital  infrastructure 
systems  for  years.” 
Congress  of  the  Unid  Sates,  Office  of  Technology 
Awxment,  De&wing  the  Go&,  April  1991 
“By  and  large,  America’s  days  of  building  whole  new  systems  of  roads 
are  over.  Attention  must  turn  now  toward  an  aggressive  program  to 
update,  maintain,  and  manage  our  existing  system.” 
Competitiveness  I’Micy  Council,  A  Competinwness 
Srmtegy  for  Amtica,  March  199.? 
potential  benefits  of  performing  regular  maintenance  activities  are  not 
realized.“’  Rodney  Slater,  administrator  of  the  Federal  Highway 
Administration,  (FHWA),  recently  noted,  “collectively,  the  federal? 
state,  and  local  governments  are  not  investing  at  a  rate  to  maintain 
overall  conditions  and  performance.‘lg  The  practice  of  deferring  maintee 
nance  has  had  deleterious  effects  on  the  quality  of  the  nation’s  infra- 
structure  in  virtually  every  jurisdiction. 
Evidence  of  the  problems  with  poorly  maintained  infrastructure  has 
mounted.  Each  year  brings  anecdotes  of  broken  water  mains,  bridges 
closed  for  safety  reasons,  highway  segments  repeatedly  closed  for  repair 
work,  and  so  on.  Examples  include: 
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The  main  road  between  Baton  Rouge  and  Shreveport,  Louisiana,  is 
so  bad  that  truckers  drive  130  miles  out  of  their  way  to  avoid  the 
roa.d.‘O 
In  Ohio,  605  bridges  have  been  closed,  and  another  4,000  show 
ominous  signs  of  dctcrioration.  I’  In  Texas,  the  structural  deficiencies 
of  bridges  are  estimated  to  cost  over  $2  billion.”  An  average  of  120 
bridges  collapse  each  year  across  the  nation.” 
l  Chicago  taxpayers  suffered  over  $1  billion  in  emergency  response 
costs,  property  damage,  and  lost  business  when  a  break  in  the  retain- 
ing  wall  holding  back  the  Chicago  River  flooded  the  downtown. 
City  transportation  officials  had  relegated  repair  of  the  leaky  wall  to 
low  priority  status;  repair  of  the  leaks  would  have  cost  $10,000.‘4 
l  A  1992  survey  by  Fi~nci~l  W&-I  of  29  cities  found  that  25  of  them 
had  postponed  replacement  and  repair  of  infrastructure  and  20  had 
postponed  preventive  maintenance.15 
Impetus  for  changing  the  current  way of  doing  busine.ss has  come  from  sev- 
eral  directions  over  the  past  decade.  Recognition  of  the  maintenance  gap 
was made  explicit  in  the  nation’s  most  significant  transportation  initiative 
of  the  past  two  decades,  the  Intermodal  Surface  Transportation  Efficiency 
Act  (ISTEA)  of  1991.”  Although  ISTEA  does  not  set  aside  specific  per- 
tions  of  the  highway  programs  for  maintenance  activitia,  it  does,  for  the 
first  time,  make  certain  types  of  preventive  maintenance  expenditutes  eli- 
gible  for  funding.  The  Federal  Highway  Administration  is  required  to  cer- 
tify  annually  whether  states  are  properly  maintaining  the  federal-aid  high- 
way  system;  if  maintenance  is  not  adequate,  the  state  must  be  notified 
within  90  days of  the  need  to  undertake  corrective  action.” 
ISTEA  goes  further  in  recognizing  the  problem  of  deferred  maintenance 
by  requiring  state  and  local  governments  to  demonstrate  formally  by 
1996  that  they  are  “adequately  maintaining  the  transportation  systems.” 
Specifically,  states  must  develop,  establish,  and  implement  three  man- 
agement  systems:  one  to  deal  with  the  maintenance  of  highway  pave- 
ment,  one  with  bridges,  and  the  third  with  public  transportation  facili- 
ties  and  equipment.  In  urban  areas,  these  systems  must  be  developed  and 
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implemented  in  cooperation  with  the  metropolitan  planning  organiza- 
tions,  which  usually  operate  with  significant  public  involvement.  The 
management  systems  must  include  an  analysis  of  maintenance  needs  and 
the  proposals  for  the  optimal  allocation  of  funds;  both  the  analysis  and 
the  proposals  are  required  to  be  aired  in  public.  Significantly,  failure  to 
have  the  management  systems  in  place  by  FY  1996  will  result  in  a  10 
percent  penalty  of  apportioned  highway  funds  and  transit  funds. 
Another,  more  subtle,  push  toward  preservation  of  the  existing  system 
comes  from  the  linkage  between  the  environmental  provisions  of  the 
Clean  Air  Act  Amendments  of  1990  and  travel  demand  measures  incor- 
porated  in  ISTEA.  These  measures  and  the  watchdog  activities  of 
national  and  grassroots  environmental  groups  are  creating  pressures  on 
many  regions  not  to  build  new  roads  and  highway  systems;  the  altema- 
tives  for  many  jurisdictions  are  to  confront  the  need  for  better  mainte- 
nance  and  to  examine  measures  to  upgrade  highway  and  mass  transit 
facilities  to  reduce  the  need  for  new  roads. 
The  Federal  Accounting  Standards  Advisory  Board,  an  interagency 
commission  that  recommends  accounting  principles  for  the  federal  gov- 
ernment,  is  discussing  “a  proposal  on  accounting  for  and  reporting 
deferred  maintenance.  Conceptually,  the  proposal  recommends  the 
recording  of  required  future  maintenance  and  deferred  maintenance.“‘n 
The  board  is  expected  to  promulgate  the  standards  for  public  discussion 
in  January  1995.  Ultimately,  such  standards  could  apply  to  all  executive 
branch  agencies. 
Also  at  the  federal  level,  recent  policy  statements  from  the  administm 
tion  have  produced  some  impetus  to  change.  For  example,  Executive 
Order  12893,  “Principles  for  Federal  Infrastructure  Investments,”  issued 
on  January  28,  1994,  directs  federal  agencies  to  incorporate  into  all 
infrastructure  spending  programs  the  systematic  analysis  of  expected 
benefits  and  costs  over  the  full  life  cycle  of  each  project,  to  conduct  pen- 
odic  reviews  of  the  operation  and  maintenance  of  existing  facilities,  and 
to  encourage  more  effective  state  and  local  programs.  In  response  to  the 
executive  order,  the  Department  of  Transportation  issued  an  interim 
policy  statement  that  establishes  life-cycle  cost  analysis  principles  to  be 
applied  by  the  Federal  Highway  Administration  in  analyzing  infrastruc- 
ture  investment  and  in  evaluating  state  highway  investment  decisions 
involving  federal-aid  funds.”  The  policy  would  require  consideration  of 
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long-term  maintenance  costs,  costs  of  fepetitivc  maintenance  and  lane 
closings,  and  user  costs  in  project  cost  analyses.  Additional  technical 
guidance  and  training  courses  arc  under  development  to  help  states 
apply  lifc-cycle  cost  analysis  to  all  types  of  new  construction,  mainte- 
nance,  and  restoration  programs.” 
In  April  1994,  the  FHWA  issued  a  policy  directive  making  it  possible  to 
obtain  contractor  warranties  on  federal-aid  highway  projects.  Warranties 
had  heen  prohibited  hecause  it  was  thought  that  they  might  involve  the 
federal  government  in  maintenance-related  work.  Warranties,  however, 
can  be  useful  to  a  state  interested  in  testing  innovative  highway  tech- 
nologies  or  materials  without  assuming  undue  risk  or  for  projects  that 
officials  suspect  will  require  additional  repair  work.  A  warranty  can 
relieve  the  state  transportation  department  of  repair  work  for  which  the 
contractor  is  properly  accountable.  As  of  spring  1994,  nine  states  had 
included  warranty  clauses  in  highway  contracts  for  33  projects.” 
Still  more  pressure  to  close  the  maintenance  gap  might  come  from  an 
effort  to  raise  the  accountability  of  public  decision  makers.  The 
Governmental  Accounting  Standards  Board  (GASB),  which  sets  the 
standards  for  state  and  local  government  accounting  and  financial 
reporring,  is  developing  guidelines  for  reporting  the  condition  of  govern- 
ment  buildings  and  infrastructure.  The  GASB  and  those  who  analyze 
the  financial  condition  of  state  and  local  governments  have  long  been 
concerned  that  a  significant  financial  liability  was  quietly  building  up  as 
expensive  repairs  and  renovations  were  postponed  for  decades.  The 
GASB  recently  issued  a  statement  on  Service  Efforts  and 
Accomplishments  Reporting,  which  will  lay  the  groundwork  for  stan- 
dards  in  this  area  and  for  subsequent  progress  on  reporting  deferred 
maintenance.  x  According  to  informal  discussions  with  GASB  officials, 
ultimately  that  body  will  require  spate  and  local  government  financial 
reports  to  include  a  separate  accompanying  schedule  that  clearly  and 
publicly  documents  the  cost  of  returning  infrastructure  assets  to  an 
acceptable  condition,  including  the  extra  costs  associated  with  the  prac- 
tice  of  deferred  maintenmce. 
Some  states  are  already  encouraging  their  municipalities  to  set  up  dedi- 
cated  funds  for  infrastructure  repairs  and  modifications.  For  example, 
Wisconsin’s  Department  of  Natural  Resources  requires  municipalities  to 
submit  annual  reports  that  assess  the  physical  condition  and  pcrfor- 
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mat-ice  of  their  sewage  systems.zJ  Ohio  requires  local  applicants  for  findn- 
cial  support  for  public  works  to  provide  a  capital  improvements  report 
that  includes  an  inventory  of  existing  capital  improvement  needs,  a  plan 
detailing  the  capital  improvement  needs  in  the  next  five  years,  and  a  list 
of  the  community’s  priorities  for  addressing  those  needs.>’ 
In  light  of  these  developments,  the  time  is  ripe  to  come  to  grips  with  the 
deferred  maintenance  problem.  This  report  proposes  a  one-time  project 
to  tackle  the  backlog  of  neglect  through  a  state  and  municipal  infrastruc- 
ture  bond  issue.  The  bonds  would  be  partially  subsidized  by  the  federal 
government  through  reimbursement  for  the  interest  costs;  they  would  be 
dedicated  to  upgrading  and  preserving  existing  infrastructure.  Section  II 
of  this  paper  includes  a  closer  examination  of  the  problems  with  the 
nation’s  transportation  infrastructure  and  estimates  of  the  costs  of  main 
tenance  and  upgrading.  In  Section  III,  the  bond  program  is  explained, 
followed  by  an  analysis  of  the  available  sources  of  funding  in  Section  IV 
and  positive  economic  effects  in  Section  V.  Additional  technical  infor- 
mation  on  municipal  bond  financing  is  presented  in  two  appendixes. 
IL  Defining the Problem 
The  nation’s  network  of  transportation  infrastructure  encompasses  a 
wide  range  of  modes,  facilities,  routes,  and  services,  with  widely  varying 
levels  of  quality  and  modernization.”  Within  any  given  transportation 
system  there  are  also  widely  varying  conditions.  One  of  the  best&own 
components  of  rhe  transportation  infrastructure,  for  example,  is  the 
45,300-mile  Interstate  Highway  System.  While  over  60  percent  of  inter+ 
state  pavement  is  rated  “good”  by  the  Department  of  Transportation,  at 
35  years  old,  it  has  almost  outlived  its  design  life,  and  parts  of  it  are 
beginning  to  deteriorate.*6 
Table  1  presents  a  summary  of  physical  conditions  of  bridges,  transit, 
and  federal-aid  highways  in  recent  years.  The  data  indicate  progress  in 
most  areas,  although  a  backlog  of  deficiencies  remains.  Pavement  condi- 
tion  has  been  improving  in  recent  years;  the  percentage  of  nonlocal 
mileage  rated  poor  or  unpaved  declined  from  21.8  percent  in  1989  to 
19.5  percent  in  1991.  About  8  percent  of  bridges  on  nonlocal  systems  are 
in  poor  to  critical  condition.  Bridge  performance  has  improved,  with 
only  6.8  percent  of  interstate  bridges  considered  structurally  deficient. 
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However,  25  to  30  percent  of  all  nonlocal  bridges  are  still  considered 
deficient.li  Transit  facilities  have  seen  across-the-board  improvements  in 
the  last  decade,  although  significant  portions  of  capital  stock  are  still 
below  desirable  levels. 
The  Muintenance  Manual  published  by  the  American  Association  of 
State  Highway  and  Transportation  Officials  (AASHTO)  distinguishes 
four  subcategories  in  construction  and  maintenance:  (1)  construction 
and  reconstruction;  (2)  betterment;  (3)  physical  maintenance;  and  (4) 
traffic  services.‘*  Nevertheless,  the  boundaries  between  maintenance 
and  construction  can  overlap  considerably  and  vary  across  jurisdic- 
tions. 
The  specific  focus  of  this  proposal  is  the  preservation  and  upgrading  of 
existing  infrastructure,  activities  that  keep  public  capital  in  good  work- 
ing  order  and  that  increase  the  life  expectancy  and  sustainable  use  of 
existing  infrastructure  by  10  to  30  years.  Excluded  from  consideration  are 
the  routine  types  of  operations  and  maintenance  activities-snow  and 
trash  removal,  security  services,  patching  potholes,  fiiing  broken  traffic 
lights  and  meters,  and  so  forth.  Also  excluded,  at  the  other  end,  are 
activities  that  constitute  major  expansions  in  infrastructure,  such  as 
building  new  highways,  purchasing  rights-of-way,  and  reconstructing 
bridges.  The  emphasis  is  on  eliminating  the  backlog  of  deficiencies  so 
that  preventive  maintenance  can  be  succe&ully  implemented. 
Examples  of  the  types  of  activities  that  could  be  included  in 
posal  are: 
this  pro- 
Bridge  maintenance,  such  as  scraping  and  painting  with  specialized 
paints  to  increase  the  lifespan  of  a  bridge. 
Pavement  repairs  that  improve  performance  and  the  lifetime  of  the 
roadway,  including  patching,  resutf%ng,  se~11  cvating,  repairing  joints, 
grinding  and  grooving  of  pavement,  repairs  to  subbase,  drainage. 
Upgrading  transit  facilities  to  make  public  transportation  more 
attractive  and  convenient  to  a  wider  range  of  users.  Upgrading  rail- 
road  tracks  and  equipment  to  allow  for  higher-speed  rail  service. 
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Conditions 
Federal-Aid  Highway  Pavement 
Condition  1989  199lb 
lbor  and  unpwd  21.8%  19.5% 
Mediocre  (called  low  hir  in  1989) 
Fair  (c&d  high  fair  in  1989) 
31.0%  11.9% 
12.2%  31.9% 
GMxl  35.0%  36.7% 
Total  100.0%  100.0% 
Bridge 
Number  (Percent) 
Performance  199@  1992d 
lntersca~e 
Ocher  arterkl 
Collecw 
L0cal 
3,848  (  7.2%)  *  3,697  (  6.8%)  * 
15,989  (12.8%)  17,509  (13.2%1 
33,056  (20.1%)  28,373  (1756%) 
-81,179  (34.6%)  68.974  (30.3%) 
Function~y  Obsokte 
Interstate 
Other  arrerial 
G.?llecRX 
11,360  (21.4%)  10,028  (18.5%) 
2.3,502  (18.9’+  -  22,856  (17.2%) 
~~ 
i3,566  (14.3%)  19.744  (12.3%) 
Condition  1991’ 
Fair/satisfactory  28.6% 
Poor 
Very  poor/critical 
5.4% 
2.2% 
20  P&k  P&q  Brief Table  1  (cont’d.1  Summary  of  Federal-Aid Highway  Pavement,  Bridge,  and 
Transit  Conditions 
Transit 
Tmk 
percent  in  Bad,  Poor,  or  Fair  Condition 
1984’  1992C 
56%  37% 
Rolling  stock  64%  24% 
Power  s&Wions  34%  38% 




58%  43% 
71%  34% 
68%  24% 
Maintenance  facilities 
Mamtenancc  yards 
72%  48% 
83%  65% 
Sources:  ‘U.S.  DOT  $l991),  Exhibit  12.  ‘U.S.  DOT  (1993),  Exhibit  3-12.  ‘US.  DOT 
(1991),  Exhibit  14.  U.S.  DOT  (1993),  Exhihits  3-21,  3-22,  3-23,  and  dam  protrided  b\r 
Cliff  Como,  Department  of  Transpor 
U.S.  DOT  (1993),  Exhihit  3-24.  !a 
tion.  ‘Data  apply  to  federal-aid  highways  only. 
US.  DOT  (1993)  Exhihir  2.  gFederal  Transit 
Adminisuation  (1992),  pp.  34-42. 
l  Purchase  and  installation of  information  management  systems,  such 
as  geographic information  systems,  to  monitor  maintenance  condi- 
tions  and  provide  early  warnings  of  deficiencies. 
l  Purchase  and  installation of  new  maintenance  equipment that  will 
permit  use  of  better  performing materials  or  technologies  or  that  will 
increase  the  efficiency  and  safety  of  maintenance  work. 
As  one  would  expect,  the  “ounce  of  prevention”  adage  applies  to  infra- 
structure.  Preventive maintenance,  such  as  scraping  and  painting  bridges 
and  applying  seal  coats  to  pavement,  can  slow  the  rate  of  deterioration 
and  extend  the  useful  life  of  an  asset.  If  pavement  joints  and  cracks  are 
not  filled  with  sealant,  water  may  intrude,  shortening the  life  of  the 
pavement.  Bridges  that  are  not  regularly  painted  will  rust,  and  the  weak- 
ened  bridge  structure  can  pose  a  safety  hazard. 
The  costs  of  inadecluate maintenance  can  be  significant. According to 
the  U.S.  Department  of  Transportation,  pavements that  are  allowed  to 
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Maintaining  Bridges 
Bridge  inspection  was  a  relatively  haphazard  affair  until  the  1967  col- 
lapse  of  the  Silver  Bridge  over  the  Ohio  River,  which  killed  46  peo# 
pie.  Congress  then  established  a  federal  program  for  bridge  inspec- 
tion,  and  national  standards  were  put  in  place  by  1972  for  the  scope 
and  frequency  of  inspections. 
Bridges  that  are  consistently  mainmined  can  last  indefinitely.  They 
don’t  fall  down  and  they  do  not  require  reconstruction.  Some  parts 
are  subject  to  wear  and  tear,  however,  and  require  periodic  replace- 
ment  or  upgrading.  Expansion  joints  and  hearings,  for  example,  tend 
to  need  replacement  every  10  to  15  years.  Resurfacing  of  a  bridge’s 
deck  with  hetter  materials  can  extend  the  life  of  the  deck  for  an 
additional  10  years.  According  to  a  1988  report  on  the  status  of  New 
York’s  bridges: 
“Without  an  active  preventive  maintenance  program,  the  City’s 
bridge  managers  are  always  forced  to  play  a  game  of  catch-up.  It  is 
only  through  preventive  maintenance  that  bridges  can  he  preserved 
in  good  working  order,  thus  breaking  the  cycle  of  deterioration.  Once 
a  full  service  preventive  maintenance  program  is  carried  out  on  an 
inventory  of  Good  and  Veq  Good  bridges,  not  only  will  repair  needs 
he  minimal,  but  no  hridge  should  deteriorate  to  Fair  condition.” 
Source;  New  York  Ciry  Department  of  Tmnqm-tatim  C  1988). 
deteriorate  into  the  “poor”  category  must  he  reconstructed  at  a  unit  cost 
two-and-a-half  to  four  times  the  cost  of  resurfacing  the  road  while  it  is 
still  rated  in  “mediocre”  condition.  (Reconstruction  typically  involves 
removing  and  replacing  paving  material  down  to  the  subbase.) 
Meanwhile,  until  improvements  are  made,  highway  users  incur  added 
costs  in  the  form  of  added  vehicle  maintenance,  fuel  and  oil  consump- 
tion,  and  tire  wear.  Roads  in  poor  condition  often  require  lower  traffic 
speeds,  adding  to  the  time  needed  to  complete  a  given  trip.>’ 
Studies  of  the  interstate  system  have  shown  that  a  failure  to  perform 
needed  maintenance  can  he  quite  costly.  One  study  cited  by  the  U.S. 
General  Accounting  Office  (GAO)  found  that  when  the  State  of  Utah 
deferred  $7  million  in  preventive  and  corrective  maintenance  costs  in 
one  year,  it  increased  the  costs  of  future  preservation  projects  hy  $42 
million.‘”  A  1993  report  by  the  Advisory  Commission  on A  Financing  Pkm to Eliminute de  Deferred Maintenunce on  the N&m’s  Ro& 
Intergovernmental  Relations  confirms  what  every  state  and  local  gov- 
emment  budget  oficer  and  auditor  knows-maintenance  deferred  today 
results  in  higher  costs  in  the  fbure.” 
Needs  i3timaces 
How  extensive  are  the  backlogs  of  deferred  maintenance  and  needed 
upgrades?  In  1991,  the  GAO  reported  that  four  out  of  the  seven  states  it 
examined  had  unfunded  maintenance  needs  for  the  interstate  system 
and  had  failed  to  perform  needed  maintenance,  such  as  sealing  joints 
and  cracks,  painting  and  repairing  bridges,  patching  concrete  pavement, 
and  repairing  guardrails.Jz  The  four  states  with  unfunded  mainmnance 
needs  cited  a  lack  of  budget  support,  while  the  three  states  that  wcrc  able 
to  meet  their  interstate  maintenance  obligations  cited  legislative  support 
for  maintenance  programs.  In  1994,  an  updated  GAO  study  reported 
that  all  six  of  the  states  it  examined  “lacked  sufficient  funds  to  cover 
needed  maintenance  work”  and  had  postponed  needed  repairs  on  high- 
way  and  bridges.‘? 
In  aggregate  dollar  terms,  the  size  of  the  maintenance  gap  as  reported  by 
the  Department  of  Transportation  is  substantial  and  widening.  DOT’s 
most  recent  cost  estimates  for  maintaining  or  improving  conditions 
remain  astronomically  high?  . 
l  The  annual  cost  over  the  next  20  years  just  to  maintain  highway, 
bridge,  and  transit  conditions  and  performance  at  current  levels 
was  estimated  in  1991  at  $55,5  billion. 
l  The  annual  cost  over  the  next  20  years  to  improve  highway, 
bridge,  and  transit  conditions  and  performance  was  estimated  in 
1991  at  $73.7  billion. 
l  Actual  capital  expenditures  by  state  and  local  governments  on 
arterial  and  collector  highways  and  bridges  in  1991  were  $26.4 
billion;  the  cost  of  maintaining  those  systems’  performance  was 
estimated  at  $47.2  billion  annually,  leaving  a  current  annual 
shortfall  of  $20.8  billion.” 
An  alternative  approach  is  to  estimate  the  total  cost  of  improving  condi- 
tions  and  performance  and  eliminating  backlogs  of  deficiencies  (defined 
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as  a  violation  of  at  least  one  minimum  condition  standard).  As  of  the  end 
of  1991,  the  DOT  estimated  the  total  cost  of  eliminating  existing  backlog 
bridge  deficiencies  at  $78  billion.  The  total  cost  to  eliminate  the  existing 
hacklog  of  highway  pavement  deficiencies  and  capacity  deficiencies  on 
arterials  and  collectors  was  estimated  at  $212  billion,  which  is  $7  h&on 
more  than  it  would  have  cost  to  eliminate  the  backlog  in  1989.  (Capaciry 
deficiencies  represent  58  percent  of  the  backlog;  the  remainder  consists  of 
pavement  deficiencies.)‘6  The  total  cost  to  eliminate  the  1992  hacklog  of 
bus  and  rail  transit  deficiencies  was  placed  at  $17.6  billion.jr 
Most  analysts  believe  that  the  DOT’s  numbers  represent  benchmarks 
rather  than  actual  targets,  and  even  the  DOT  notes  that  rhey  are  not 
recommended  as  an  invesrment  strategy.  The  figures  include  pavement 
improvements  on  little-used  roads  and  capacity  expansions  in  high-cost 
urban  areas  that  may  never  be  made  because  of  lack  of  need,  lack  of 
resources,  or  siting  problems.  The  DOT  cautions,  however,  that  even  at 
the  high  end  of  its  estimates,  transportation  systems  in  the  nation’s  33 
largest  urban  areas  would  not  function  at  desired  levels.  Poorer  roads  and 
increased  congestion  are  likely  to  occur  even  with  reasonably  optimistic 
assumptions  ahout  the  rate  of  growth  in  travel  demand,  aggressive 
expansion  of  transit  and  intelligent  vehicle/highway  applications,  and 
expanded  capital  investment. 
Ill.  The Proposal  Taxable State and Local 
Bonds 
Infrastructure 
I  propose  a  one-time,  major  infrastructure  program  to  upgrade  and  pre- 
serve  infrastructure,  funded  through  taxable  state  and  local  bonds.  One 
of  the  unique  features  of  the  program  is  that  the  federal  government  is  to 
reimburse  the  interest  costs  of  the  bonds,  with  payments  spread,  in  capi- 
tal  budget  style,  over  the  “useful  life”  of  the  renovations  (say,  15  years). 
At  the  present  time,  I  recommend  a  modest  pilot  progmm-using  as 
examples  a  $10  billion  and  a  $25  billion  program-for  a  major  upgrading 
of  roads,  bridges,  and  transit  facilities. 
The  program  has  three  major  components: 
1.  The  focus  is  on  a  one-time  effort  m  t&qz&  the  nation’s  infrastruc- 
ture,  eliminating  much  of  the  backlog  of  deferred  maintenance 
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needs  and  locking  in  the  upgraded  maintenance  status.  This  focus 
on  maintenance  rather  than  new  projects  means  limited  start-up 
delays  and  few  of  the  political  machinations  that  often  accompany 
new  construction  projects.  Maintenance  gains  would  be  locked  in 
through  the  use  of  new  high-performance  materials  and  mainte- 
nance  covenants  in  the  bond  fiicing  conditions. 
2.  PartiaI  federa!  financing  through  a  reimbursement  of  the  interest 
payments  on  tuxuHe  srate  and  rnm-Cpal  bonds  over  the  life  of 
those  bonds.  Real  federal  expenditure  would  be  less  than  the 
actual  federal  reimbursement,  since  the  federal  government 
would  collect  significant  taxes  on  the  interest  payments  received 
by  the  holders  of  the  taxable  bonds. 
3.  Attructing  w.sion  finds.  This  proposal  would  authorize  the  cre- 
ation  of  a  standard  fixed-income  instrument  that  will  readily 
compete  in  the  Treasury  and  coTorate  bond  market  and  be 
attractive  to  the  vast  pool  of  private  and  public  pension  funds. 
A.  One-Time  Effort  to  Eliminate  Backlog 
Because  the  program  is  focused  on  maintenance  activities,  many  of  the 
usual  start-up  delays  associated  with  large-scale  construction  projects 
would  be  avoided.  Most  state,  county,  and  city  public  works  departments 
are  well  aware  of  their  top  maintenance  priorities.  Limited  or  fewer  stud- 
ies  would  be  needed  rather  than  full-scale  environmental  impact  assess- 
ments  and  complex  feasibility  studies.  The  often-heard  charges  of  wast- 
ing  taxpayer  dollars  on  “pork”  projects  would  similarly  be  avoided. 
Because  maintenance  is  not  a  particularly  glamorous  activity,  political 
mischief-making  and  media  attention  are  likely  to  be  minimized  on 
these  project.s.  The  re-election  incentives  that  distort  choices  made  by 
public  officials  are  absent. 
Since  the  problem  is  that  otherwise  responsible  officials  do  not  fund 
maintenance  (or  find  it  difficult  to  do  so)  on  an  ongoing,  year-in,  year- 
out  basis,  it  may  seem  surprising  to  propose  a  one-time  maintenance 
upgrading  program.  My  response  is  threefold.  First,  many  jurisdictions 
have  substantial  backlogs  that  they  cannot  get  out  from  under.  This  pro- 
posal  would  tackle  those  backlogs  directly  and  presumably  put  the  local- 
ity  back  in  a  position  to  use  its  own  resources  to  deal  with  routine  main- 
The _kromc Levy  Economics  hwitwe  oj  Bard  College  25 In+ructure  hesmwnt  for  Tomorrow 
tenance  obligations  as  they  accrue.  Second,  by  using  high-performance 
materials  and  technologies  to  change  the  nature  of  the  facilities,  less 
future  maintenance  woik  will  be  required.  Third,  I  propose  the  use  of 
maintenance  covenants  to  lock  in  ongoing  maintenance  practices.  The 
second  and  third  elements  are  discussed  further  below. 
One  way  of  achieving  permanent  improvements  in  infrastructure  quality 
is  to  require,  as  a  condition  of  receiving  federal  reimbursement,  the  use 
of  life-cycle  cost  analysis  and  high-performance  materials  and  technolo- 
gics,  wherever  feasible  and  cost-effective. 
Road  maintenance  problems  are  exacerbated  by  the  USC of  conventional 
technologies  and  design  specifications  that  are  intended  to  produce 
roads  that  last  only  20  years.  Recently  federal  agencies  and  state  govem- 
ments  have  become  interested  in  the  standards  for  road  building  used  in 
Europe.‘*  These  standards  call  for  thicker  surfaces,  foundation  materials 
that  drain  better,  and  thicker  foundations.  Such  roads  involve  higher  up- 
front  costs,  but  cost  less  to  maintain;  rather  than  being  built  to  last  20 
years,  they  are  designed  for  a  30  to  50  year  lifespan.  0vcr  their  life  cycle, 
they  result  in  cost  savings  through  reduced  maintenance  and  less  down- 
time  (see  “Redesigning  American  Roads”).  In  addition,  the  cost  of  dis- 
rupting  service  to  perform  maintenance  is  minimized.  This  cost  can  be 
significant,  both  to  the  government  agency  and  to  road  users.  The 
Department  of  Transportation  estimates  that  in  1991,  half  the  cost  of  all 
capital  investments  in  improving  pavement  conditions  or  increasing 
highway  capacity  was  spent  on  tmffic  control  and  rerouting.W 
Maintenunce  Covenants 
In  my  view,  backsliding-the  “cut  the  ribbon  and  run”  syndrome  that 
follows  construct9on  or  reconstruction  projects-is  eminently  pre- 
ventable.  The  demonstrable  benefits  of  the  one-time  upgmding  program 
can  be  locked  in  through  the  use  of  maintenance  covenants  as  an  essen- 
tial  condition  of  bond  financing. 
I  propose  that  the  federal  statute  creating  the  program  require  participate 
ing  state  and  local  governments  to  covenant,  in  the  bonds’  financing 
documents,  that  they  will  maintain  the  facilities  at  their  upgraded  level 
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of  performance.  Maintenance  covenants  are  routinely  and  successfully 
used  for  such  revenue-producing  facilities  as  sewer  and  water  lines  and 
toll  bridges  and  roads.  (They  have  not,  to  my  knowledge,  been  used  for 
general  obligation  bonds.)  Typical  language,  in  this  case  applying  to  the 
Massachusetts  Turnpike,  is  as  follows: 
The  [Massachusetts  Turnpike]  Authority  shall  at  all  times  .  .  .  maintain, 
preserve,  reconstruct  and  keep  the  same,  or  cause  the  same  to  hc  so 
Redesigning  American  Roads 
The  superiority  of  European  roads  comes  from  a  mixture  of  technical 
and  institutional  factors.  Technical  factors  include  stronger  bases 
and  subgrade  support;  a  concern  for  the  total  pavement  structure 
rather  than  thickness  alone;  and  superior  mix  design  of  concrete. 
Institutional  factors  include  more  preventive  maintenance  funded  by 
gas  taxes;  stronger  industry  involvement  in  research;  and  more 
responsibility  given  to  contractors  in  selecting  materials  in  return  for 
contractor  warranties. 
In  New  York  State,  officials  recently  embarked  on  a  review  of  state 
practices  in  road  design.  Such  a  review  had  not  been  done  since  the 
interstate  period  of  the  late  1950s  and  early  1960s.  Problems  with 
existing  design  included  its  limited  20-year  lifespan;  poor  drainagi; 
excess  faulting,  joint  spalling,  and  cracking;  thin  asphalt  shoulders; 
and  high  maintenance  costs.  The  goal  was  to  achieve  the  opposite, 
increasing  durability  to  a  50-year  lifespan,  improving  long-term  per- 
formance,  minimizing  traffic  disruptions  from  constant  repair,  and 
lowering  life-cycle  costs. 
In  several  demonstration  projects,  New  York  State  redesigned  its 
roads  and  standards,  strengthening  the  base  by  adding  a  four-inch 
treated  permeable  base,  improving  drainage  placement,  widening  the 
driving  lanes,  and  adding  full-depth  shoulders.  Life-cycle  analysis 
and  pavement  performance  analysis  showed  a  large  benefit  in  adopt- 
ing  the  new  approaches,  especially  for  high-volume  roads.  The 
higher  initial  project  costs  of  the  new  approaches  constituted  less 
than  0.5%  of  overall  program  costs,  and  were  coupled  with  projected 
lower  annual  maintenance  costs. 
Smuce:  Roger  M.  Larxm,  Federal  Highway  Administration,  and  Michael  J.  Cuddy, 
New  York  State  Department  oc  Transportation,  presentations  at  the  Transportation 
Research  Board  73rd  Annual  Meeting,  Washington,  DC.,  January  9-13,  1994. 
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maintained,  preserved,  reconstructed  and  kept,  with  the  appurtermnces 
and  every  part  and  parcel  thereof,  in  good  repair,  working  order  and  con- 
dition,  and  shall  from  time  to  time  make,  or  cause  to  be  made,  all  neces- 
sary  and  proper  repairs,  replacements  and  renewals.“’ 
Other  types  of  covenants  incorporate  professional  architecture  standards 
and  engineering  specifications  and  require  annual  public  reports  as  to 
adherence  to  those  standards  and  specifications.  In  the  case  of  O’Hare 
Airport,  for  example,  an  independent  consultant  is  hired  each  year  to 
assess  the  condition  of  the  airport  and  report  on  the  improvements 
needed. 
With  all  significant  public  borrowings,  it  is  routine  for  a  bank  trustee  to 
be  appointed  to  represent  the  bondholders’  interests.  If  the  covenant  is 
breached-for  example,  if  the  issuer  has  not  taken  steps  to  prevent 
bridge  deterioration  over  a  period  of  time-the  trustee  has  the  authority 
to  enforce  the  covenant,  including  seeking  a  court  decree.  The  issuer 
would  be  required  to  adhere  to  the  covenant  language  (in  the  example 
above,  requiring  that  the  bridge  be  repaired).  While  not  exactly  the 
same  situation,  a  case  involving  a  financial  covenant  was  argued  before 
the  U.S.  Supreme  Court.  The  covenant  was  established  by  concurrent 
statutes  in  two  states  and  restricted  the  use  of  the  proceeds  of  a  bi-state 
authority  bond  issue.  The  Supreme  Court  affirmed  the  covenant  as  valid 
in  1977  on  the  grounds  that  the  contract  clause  of  the  U.S.  Constitution 
protects  such  arrangements.4’ 
In  the  proposed  program,  the  federal  statute  would  stipulate  inclusion  of 
covenant  language  in  each  bond  similar  to  that  cited  above  for  the 
MassachusetL5  Turnpike  Authority.  There  is  no  legal  (and  certainly  no 
moral  or  ethical)  reason  why  the  use  of  such  covenants  cannot  be  broad- 
ened  beyond  non+011  road  and  bridge  situations.  Naturally,  states  and 
localities  are  not  eager  to  bind  themselves  in  this  way  and  would  not  ini- 
tiate  such  an  option.  In  this  case,  however,  there  is  a  substantial  benefit 
to  be  gained-significant  federal  reimbursement  for  repairs  they  are  ultie 
mately  going  to  make  anyway-by  agreeing  to  such  a  covenant. 
The  authorizing  statute  would  state  that  the  purpose  of  the  covenant  is 
twofold-to  give  effect  to  the  federal  ISTEA  requirements  that  state  and 
local  governments  establish  maintenance  programs,  and  to  slow  down 
the  practice  of  state  and  municipal  officials  seeking  public  works  grants A  Financing  P/m  to Himimte  the  Deferred  Maintenance on the Narion’s Roads 
for  new  construction  projects  necessitated  by  their  failure  to  maintain 
their  infrastructure  and  public  facilities. 
The  federal  government  has  many  tools  at  its  disposal  to  encourage 
states  to  live  up  to  their  agreements.  In  this  situation  the  federal  govern 
ment  could  just  withhold  its  reimbursement  of  debt  service  to  enforce 
the  covenant.  It  is  anticipated,  however,  that  the  bond  trustees  and/or 
the  bondholders  would  be  the  ones  to  enforce  the  covenants.  Language 
in  the  covenant  would  make  it  clear  that  the  maintenance  covenant  is  a 
contractual  obligation,  negotiated  between  the  buyer  and  seller  of  the 
bond.  It  would  state  that  regular  maintenance  can  help  eliminate  the 
financial  waste  associated  with  deferred  maintenance  and  therefore 
strengthen  the  financial  and  economic  base  of  the  government  that 
issues  the  bonds.  Regular  maintenance  offers  some  security  to  the  bond- 
holder  for  it  enhances  the  ability  of  the  state  or  local  government  to  dis- 
charge  its  debt. 
Rondholders  have  certain  expectations  with  regard  to  the  public  works 
they  help  finance,  and  those  expectations  have  meaning.  If  a  governs 
ment  enters  into  a  covenant,  that  government  should  be  held  to  the 
covenant’s  terms-even  in  situations  where  the  bondholders’  security  is 
not  totally  eroded  by  the  lack  of  the  agreed-upon  maintenance.  The 
Supreme  Court  in  the  case  cited  above  said,  “we  cannot  sustain  the 
[breach]  of  the  1962  covenant  simply  because  the  bondholders’  rights 
were  not  totally  destroyed.‘141 
While  a  maintenance  covenant  would  have  legal  standing,  its  success 
might  conceivably  bc  more  related  to  the  ballot  box  than  the  courts.  For 
instance,  a  bondholder  who  was  also  a  user  of  the  road  or  bridge  reno- 
vated  with  the  bond  proceeds  might  be  motivated  to  initiate  a  court  pro- 
ceeding  if  the  facility  deteriorated.  Gf  course,  this  would  be  publicly 
recorded  and  noted.  Governors  or  mayors  would  not  want  that  kind  of 
attention  drawn  to  their  administrations. 
E.  Taxable  Bonds;  Federal  Financing 
Since  the  182Os,  states  and  localities  have  been  allowed  to  use  tax- 
exempt  financing  to  finance  roads,  bridges,  schools,  and  water  and  sewer 
systems4)  By  exempting  interest  on  most  state  and  local  debt  from  fed- 
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era1  income  taxes,  the  federal  government  lowers  the  cost  of  borrowing 
to  states  and  municipalities.  Purchasers  of  the  state  and  local  honds  are 
willing  to  accept  a  lower  rate  of  interest  because  they  receive  interest 
payments  that  are  tax-free.  States  and  municipalities  henefit  because 
they  have  to  pay  less  interest. 
Tax-exempt  bond  financing  is  used  only  by  one  other  country  directly 
(Italy)  and  several  other  industrial  countries  indirectly.  From  a  federal 
perspective,  it  is  inherently  inefficient.  The  exemption  from  taxation 
not  only  lowers  the  cost  of  borrowing  for  state  and  local  governments,  it 
benefits  wealthy  individuals  who  take  advantage  of  tax-exempt  interest 
payments  to  increase  their  income.  (More  discussion  of  this  is  included 
in  Appendix  A.) 
Nevertheless,  this  pilot  proposal  is  not  an  attempt  to  restrict  tax-exempt 
bond  financing.  Instead,  it  takes  a  taxable-bond  approach  for  this  one- 
time  program,  for  several  reasons.  First,  the  actual  cost  to  the  federal  gov- 
ernment  would  be  lower  than  if  tax-exempt  bonds  were  used  because  of 
the  taxes  that  the  federal  government  could  collect  on  interest  payments 
to  bondholders.  Second,  pension  funds  could  become  potential  purchasers 
of  the  bonds  (see  the  discussion  below  of  “Attracting  Pension  Funds”). 
Under  this  proposal,  state  and  local  governments  would  sell  clearly  iden- 
tified,  taxable  infrastructure  bonds,  either  on  a  general  obligation  or  rev- 
enue  bond  basis.  (The  choice  of  instrument  would  depend  on  the  rev- 
enue-producing  potential  of  the  infrastructure  projects  in  question.) 
The  federal  government  would  reimburse  the  interest  payments  on  the 
bonds  as  those  payments  are  made  hy  the  state  and  local  governments. 
Estim&rg  Federal  Costs 
To  estimate  the  likely  costs  to  the  federal  government  of  the  interest 
cost  reimbursement,  I  have  made  some  simplifying  assumptions  about 
interest  rates  and  tax  rates.  For  purposes  of  this  analysis,  assume  that 
municipal  tax-exempt  bonds  yield  6.0  percent.+’  Interest  rates  on  taxable 
infrastructure  bonds  are  likely  to  range  from  150  to  200  basis  points 
above  tax-exempt  bonds.”  Major  infrastructure  renovation  projects  typi- 
cally  have  a  useful  life  of  10  to  20  years.  As  an  example  of  the  securities 
to  be  sold,  I  will  use  a  15-year  instrument  carrying  a  7.5  percent  yield. A  Finmrcing  Plan  to  Eliminate  &  Deferred  Maintenance  un  the  Natiun’s  Ruads 
The  tables  below  show  posihle  ways  of  structuring  such  a  security.  Table 
2  illustrates  a  $10  billion  program  with  a  “level  principal”  schedule 
(interest  rate  payments  descend  over  time  while  the  principal  paid  out 
remains  the  same);  this  is  the  usual  practice  for  municipal  bonds  since  it 
results  in  the  lowest  cost  of  capital  to  the  issuer.  Table  3  shows  a  level 
debt  service  arrangement  for  a  $25  b.11  I  ion  program  with  ascending  inter- 
est  payments.  Here,  the  total  debt  payments  each  year  are  the  same;  the 
repayments  of  principal  decrease  over  time  while  interest  payments  start 
low  and  rise  in  the  outyears.  Although  this  is  less  typical,  it  may  be  more 
attractive  by  offering  the  option  of  lower  initial  interest  payments  (and 
therefore  lower  initial  costs  for  the  federal  government).  Alternative 
payment  schedules  are  shown  in  Appendix  B. 
At  $10  billion,  rhe  level  principal  financing  structure  would  result  in  a 
gross  federal  outlay  of  $6  bll  I  ion  over  15  years.  The  federal  outlay  would 
start  at  $750  million  in  the  first  year  and  gradually  drop  to  $50  million  in 
year  15,  the  final  year.  However,  as  noted  earlier,  the  real  federal  expen- 
TabIe  2  Hypothetical  Principal  and  Interest  Payments  at  7.5%  Interest 
Rate,  $lOB  Pilot  Program,  Level  Principal  ($000~) 
Principal  Interest  TOtA 
1  666,667  750,000  I ,416,667 
2  666,667  700,000  1,366,667 
3  666,667  650,000  1,316,667 
4  666,667  600,000  1,266,667 
5  666,667  550*000  1,216,667 
6  666,667  500,000  I,  166,667 
7  666,667  450,000  1,116,667 
8  666,667  4cQ,om  1,066,667 
9  666,667  350,000  1,016,667 
IO  666,667  3cQocu  966,667 
11  666,667  250,000  916,667 
12  666,667  200,000  866,667 
13  666,667  150,000  816,667 
14  666,667  lcQ,OcO  766,667  -..-  .-  -~*-. 
15  666,667  50,003  716,667 
Total  10,000,000  6,000,OOO  16,000,000 
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diture  in  each  year  would  be  lower,  since  the  federal  government  would 
collect  taxes  on  these  interest  payments,  whereas  no  taxes  are  collected 
on  the  interest  payments  on  tax-exempt  bonds.46 
The  extent  of  the  offsetting  taxes  collected  by  the  federal  government 
depends  on  the  tax  status  and  income  distribution  of  the  purchasers  of 
the  bonds.  Although  the  majority  of  tax-free  municipal  bonds  are 
bought  by  individuals  in  higher  tax  brackets  (28  percent  and  ahove),4T  a 
taxable  bond  would  likely  be  attractive  to  potential  buyers  across  a 
broader  range  of  income.  Still,  using  the  assumptions  about  interest 
rates,  the  average  federal  tax  rate  of  bondholders  would  have  to  be  as  low 
Table  3  Hypothetical  Principal  and  Interest  Pavents  at  7.5%  interest 
Rate,  $25B  Pilot  Program,  Level  Debt  Service  ($000~) 
Year  Principal  Interest  T&Ii 
1  2JP14.168  202,795  2,856,963 
2  2,465,768  391,195  2,856,963 
3  2,290,741  566,222  27856v963 
4  2,128,138  728,825  2*856?963 
5  1,977,077  879,886  2~85.6~963 
6  1  J336.739  1,020,225  2,856,963 
7  1,%6,362  1~150,601  2,856,963 
8  1,585,240  1,271,723  298569963 
9  1,472,715  1,384,248  2,856,963 
IO  I ,368,178  1,488,785  2,856,963 
11  1,271,06l  1,585,902  2,856,963 
12  1,180,838  1,676,126  2,856,963 
13  1,097,018  I ,759,945  2,856,963 
14  1*019*149  1.837.814  2.856.963 
15  946,807  1,910,156  2,856,963 
TOG31  25,000,O’N  17,854,450  42,854,450 
as  20  percent  for  the  net  cost  to  the  federal  government  of  this  program 
to  be  the  same  as  the  cost  of  reimbursing  a  state  or  locality  for  a  UX- 
exem~c  interest  payment  (i.e.,  6  percent).  This  is  calculated  as  follows: 
At  a  20  percent  average  tax  rate,  for  each  taxable  bond  bought,  the  feds 
era1  government  gains  1.5  percent  back  in  taxes  on  the  interest  (20  x 
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7.5).  The  net  cost  to  the  federal  government  after  reimbursing  interest 
payments  to  the  issuer  is  then  6  percent  (7.5  minus  1.5). 
If  the  purchaser  is  a  tax-exempt  institution,  such  as  a  pension  fund,  fed- 
eral  tax  collections  on  taxable  bonds  will  be  postponed  until  retirement 
benefits  are  collected  by  the  beneficiaries.  But  as  pension  funds  buy  the 
infi-astructure  bonds,  they  buy  fewer  of  other  bonds  (or  stocks  or  mort- 
gages).  These  other  financial  instruments,  like  the  proposed  infrastruc- 
ture  bonds,  are  taxable  until  they  move  into  a  pension  fund  portfolio  (or 
into  the  portfolios  of  other  tax-exempt  entities  such  as  university  endow- 
ment  funds).  The  size  of  a  pension  fund  is  stable  in  any  given  year;  the 
addition  of  a  new  financial  instrument  in  the  marketplace  does  not 
increase  its  size  or  annual  cash  flow.  If  pension  funds  reallocate  their 
resources,  switching  some  of  their  purchases  to  these  infrastructure 
bonds,  they  leave  more  bonds  on  the  market  to  be  bought  by  taxpaying 
individuals  and  institutions.  The  federal  government  would  come  out. 
even.  It  might  be  argued  that  more  bonds  in  the  marketplace  would 
cause  interest  rates  to  rise  slightly;  however,  the  supply  of  a  large  amount 
of  new  purchasing  power  in  the  marketplace  would  have  a  countervail- 
ing  effect. 
“Scoring”  the  Budget 
Because  the  interest  payments  on  the  proposed  program  would  be  paid 
out  over  the  course  of  a  15syear  period,  it  would  be  reasonable  for  the 
federal  budget  to  reflecr  the  expenditures  as  checks  are  written  each  year 
over  the  15-year  period,  with  the  impact  on  each  year’s  budget  adjusted 
downward  for  the  significant  taxes  the  federal  government  will  collect. 
However,  because  the  federal  government  (unlike  all  other  large  govern. 
merits  and  businesses)  does  not  have  a  capital  budget  process,  the  costs 
of  capital  projects-such  as  buildings  or  battleships  that  will  be  around 
for  dozens  of  years-are  not  stretched  over  that  period  but  are  added  to 
the  federal  budget  in  one  lump  sum.  This  unusual  federal  process  means 
that  a  payment  for  immediate  consumption  and  a  payment  for  a  long- 
lasting  investment  are  handled  in  exactly  the  same  manner  (a  factor  that 
undoubtedly  encourages  the  shifting  of  federal  spending  away  from  long- 
term  investments). 
An  initial  inquiry  in  November  1993  about  the  budget  effects  of  this 
bond  proposal  elicited  a  not-unexpected  response  from  the Infrastructure  1nwsrmmt  fur  Tomorow 
Congressional  Budget  Office  (CBO)  that  the  proposal  would  constitute 
a  loan  guarantee  under  the  provisions  of  the  Federal  Credit  Reform  Act 
of  1990.  Under  this  law,  a  loan  guarantee  is  defined  as  any  “guarantee, 
insurance,  or  other  pledge”  by  the  federal  government  with  respect  to 
the  payment  of  interest  or  principal  on  any  debt  obligation  of  a  non-fed- 
eral  borrower  to  a  non-federal  lender.+’  The  law  requires  that  the  federal 
budget  record  (or  “score”)  the  full  net  present  value  (i.e.,  the  value  of 
the  payments  if  they  were  all  paid  in  the  first  year)  of  all  interest  sub+ 
dies  associated  with  a  loan  guarantee  at  the  time  the  loan  guarantee  is 
disbursed.  The  reasoning  behind  this  approach  is  presumably  based  on 
the  federal  budgeting  process.  The  legislation  authorizing  this  program 
would  make  a  very  strong  promise  that  interest  reimbursement  payments 
would  be  made  by  the  federal  government  for  the  life  of  the  bonds. 
Therefore,  according  to  the  CBO,  the  budget  ought  to  record  whatever 
the  value  is  of  today’s  “promise”  to  pay  a  specific  amount  over  15  years. 
This  approach  seems  inconsistent  for  several  reasons.  First,  no  such  rea- 
soning  is  applied  to  the  most  sacred  “promise’*  of  all-Social  Security 
payments.  If,  say,  15  years’  worth  of  Social  Security  payments  were 
lumped  into  one  year’s  budget,  the  distortion  would  send  the  economy 
into  a  tailspin.  Second,  the  “promise”  itself  is  not  binding;  one  session  of 
Congress  cannot  legally  commit  another.  Although  state  and  local  offi- 
cials  do  rely  on  federal  aid  programs,  funds  for  many  of  these  must  be 
appropriated  each  year  (as  this  one  would  be)  and  the  programs  are  sub- 
ject  to  amendment  or  cancellation  at  any  time.  Cancellation,  although 
rare,  does  happen  with  federal  grant-in-aid  programs  (as  I  discovered 
during  my  tenure  as  a  local  government  official). 
In  addition,  the  express  purposes  of  the  Federal  Credit  Reform  Act  of 
1990  indicate  that  its  intended  scope  is  “Federal  credit  programs,”  and 
not  investment  programs  that-like  this  proposal-inadvertently  fit 
within  the  definition  of  a  loan  guarantee  because  the  federal  payments 
relate  to  interest  charges  on  a  debt  obligation.*  If  an  ambiguity  exists,  a 
new  interpretation  of  either  the  program  or  the  Federal  Credit  Reform 
Act  could  be  sought  by  members  of  Congress,  or  the  legislation  could  be 
amended  so  that  it  applies  more  strictly  to  loan  subsidy and  credit  pro- 
grams  rather  than  to  long-term  investments.  Finally,  it  is  possible  that 
the  Office  of  Management  and  Budget  (OMB)  could  reach  different 
conclusions  than  the  CBO  as  to  the  budget  effects  of  this  bond  proposal. 
34  Pubfic  Pokq  i3rief A  Finuncing  Han  w  Ehinute  rhe  Defemd  Maintenance  on  the  N&m7s  Ruads 
Under  the  act,  it  is  the  director  of  the  OMB  who  has  responsibility,  for 
the  executive  branch,  for  coordinating  the  necessary  cost  estimates.50 
However  the  budget  is  scored,  this  proposed  pilot  project  has  a  modest 
financial  impact.  Even  scoring  the  budget  for  the  full  net  present  value, 
at  a  7.5  percent  discount  rate,  the  cost  to  the  federal  government  of 
reimbursing  interest  payments  would  be  $4.1  billion  for  a  $10  billion 
program,  and  $9.1  billion  for  a  $25  billion  program.  I  believe  this  is  emi- 
nently  affordable  (see  Section  IV,  “Sources  of  Funding”),  particularly  in 
light  of  the  economic  benefit  infrastructure  investment  is  sure  to  bring. 
C .  Attracting  Pension  Ftiti 
Municipal  bond  markets  are  broad  and  active,  roughly  comparable  to  the 
corporate  debt  market.  In  1992,  more  than  $235  billion  in  debt,  includ- 
ing  over  $78  billion  in  infiz+tructure  debt,  was  sold;  roughly  half  of  the 
total  was  for  new  capital,  the  other  half  for  refinancing.51  While  munici- 
pal  bond  markets  are  considered  healthy  and  pose  a  low  credit  risk,52 
they  have  undergone  considerable  change  in  the  composition  of  invest- 
ment  in  the  last  decade.  Table  4  shows  the  percentage  of  municipal  debt 
held  by  various  categories  of  holders  between  1980  and  1990. 
Several  points  are  remarkable  about  these  figures.  First,  between  1980 
and  1990,  there  was  a  dramatic  drop  in  the  municipal  debt  holdings  of 
institutions  (banks,  savings  and  loans,  and  insurance  companies)-from 
66  to  25  percent-wing  principally  to  the  provisions  of  the  Tax  Reform 
Act  of  1986.  Conversely,  holdings  by  individuals  doubled  during  this 
tim&  period  and  holdings  by  mutual  and  money  market  fimds  increased 
tenfold.  In  1990,  individuals  held  close  to  63  percent  of  municipal 
debt-44  percent  directly  and  a  substantial  portion  (perhaps  90  percent) 
of  the  19.5  percent  of  mutual  and  money  market  funds.  Some  municipal 
bond  professionals  argue  that  the  absence  of  institutions  such  as  banks 
from  the  municipal  market  could  lead  to  instability  if  individual 
investors,  in  the  face  of  some  market  tremor,  were  to  sell  off  their  hold- 
ings.  ”  In  such  a  situation,  interest  rates  would  rise,  freezing  some  states 
and  municipalities  out  of  the  bond  market. 
A  second,  related  point  is  the  virtual  absence  of  another  type  of  stable 
institution-pension  fund.s--as  holders  of  municipal  debt.  Because  they 
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are  already  tax-exempt,  pension  funds  should  not,  and  do  not,  buy  tax- 
exempt  instruments.  On  average,  private  pension  funds  and  state  and 
local  government  retirement  funds  invest  only  0.1  percent  of  their  port- 
folios  in  tax-exempt  municipal  bonds;  their  holdings  represent  a  mere 
0.2  percent  of  outstanding  municipal  debt.V 
At  $4.78  trillion,55  pension  funds  represent  the  largest  single  pool  of 
money  in  the  country.  The  municipal  bond  market  currently  has  exten- 
sive  access  to  capital,  and  the  availability  of  this  pool  of  funds  wouId  be 
of  great  benefit.  Pension  funds  are  currently  invested  in  virtually  every 
recognized  asset  class,  such  as  stocks,  bonds,  real  estate,  and  venture  cap- 
ital,  both  in  the  United  States  and  globally.  The  exception  is  bonds 
issued  by  state  and  local  governments.  Because  the  trustees  of  pension 
funds  are  fiduciaries  and  have  an  obligation  to  maximize  return,  they 
cannot  invest  in  the  lower-yield,  tax-exempt  bonds  that  finance  roads, 
bridges,  government  office  buildings,  and  water  treatment  plants. 
State  and  local  public  pension  funds  (with  assets  of  $1.1  trillion), 
though,  are  under  enormous  pressure  to  invest  in  their  communities. 
High-ranking  officials,  including  the  president  and  three  cabinet  secre- 
taries,  as  well  as  Congress  in  the  ISTEA  legislation,  are  on  record  as 
favoring  tapping  the  funds  held  by  pension  systems  for  public  purposes?6 
The  media,  private  labor  unions,  and  even  some  trustees  themselves 
have  joined  in  what  is  developing  into  a  small  stampede.  Despite  the 
potential  risk  involved  in  some  of  the  proposed  investment,  politically 
appointed  trustees  of  public  pension  funds  find  it  hard  to  resist  the  calls 
of  their  governors  and  mayors  to  “rebuild  the  cities”  and  “revitalize  their 
economies.” 
Table  4  Composition  of  Municipal  Debt 
Commercial  hanks 
1980  1990 
41.7  11.3 
Households  21.9  44.2 
MutuA  and  monev  market  funds  1.7  19.5 
Insurance  companies  23.9  14.@ 
Pension  funds  1.1  0.2 
Orher  9.7  IO.8 
Sowce:  Congres+mai  Budger  Office  (1994a),  Table  3,  p.  24. 
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As  a  result,  a  variety  of  mechanisms  have  been  proposed  to  make  tax- 
exempt  bonds  attractive  to  pension  funds,  including  subsidies  to  pension 
funds,  infrastructure  bond  banks,  and  special  financing  instruments. 
Other  proposals  would  have  the  funds  make  “economic”  investments 
that  private  investors  universally  shun. 
Many  of  the  proposals,  however,  are  quite  serious.  For  example: 
l  Financier  Felix  Rohatyn  has  spoken  widely  about  a  proposed  lo- 
year,  $250  billion  public  works  program  to  create  1  million  jobs, 
financed  through  bonds  sold  to  private  and  public  pension  funds. 
The  Department  of  Housing  and  Urban  Development  has  under+ 
taken  a  program  to  produce  $1.2  billion  of  affordable  housing  by 
attracting  pension  fund  invcstmcnt,  with  $100  million  in  federal 
funds  and  guarantees. 
l  The  ISTEA  legislation  created  a  commission  to  study  the  feasibil- 
ity  and  desirability  of  “creating  a  type  of  infrastructure  security  to 
permit  the  investment  of  pension  funds  in  funds  used  to  design, 
plan,  and  construct  infrastructure  facilities  in  the  United  States.” 
Following  a  series  of  hearings,  the  commission  recommended  that 
a  National  Infrastructure  Corporation  be  established  to  provide  a 
range  of  credit  enhancement  and  development  insurance  services, 
as  well  as  direct  loans  for  certain  types  of  infrastructure  projects. 
Both  the  corporation’s  proposed  subsidiary,  an  infrastructure 
insurance  company,  and  the  taxable  debt  securities  that  the  cor- 
poration  would  itself  issue  were  presumed  to  offer  institutions  such 
as  pension  funds  the  opportunity  to  invest  in  infrastructure.5i 
l  Twenty-two  states  have  passed  laws  or  programs  encouraging  pen- 
sion  funds  to  make  so-called  economically  targeted  investments 
(ETls),  particularly  in-state  investments  designed  to  create  local  jobs. 
l  In  June  1994,  the  Labor  Department  issued  guidelines  aimed  at 
encouraging  pension  funds  to  make  investments  in  affordable 
housing  and  other  ETIs.~~  The  guidelines  allow  pension  fund 
trustees  to  consider  the  collateral  benefits  of  socially  worthwhile 
projects  when  choosing  among  alternatives.  Naturally,  the  guide- 
lines  state  that  the  investments  must  be  for  the  benefit  of  workers 
and  retirees  and  produce  competitive  financial  returns. 
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By  now,  many  public  pension  funds  have  signed  on  to  the  ET1  concept 
and  invested  in  projects  that  range  from  affordable  housing  to  golf  courses 
to  smell  business.  Even  some  Pr&zte  funds,  headquartered  in  New  York 
City,  indicated  they  would  consider  investing  in  a  state-sponsored  fund 
for  business  investments.  Numerous  critics-including  myself-have 
charged  these  ET1  proposals  with  attempting  to  foist  risky  social  investing 
on  pension  funds.  Typically>  pension  funds  invest  in  recognized  asset 
classes  where  the  investments  are  screened  by  expert  staff  and  consul- 
tants,  usually  after  following  a  rigid  set  of  investment  procedures.  ET%, 
however,  are  not  a  recognized  asset.  They  have  no  measurable  rates  of 
return  and  no  fiscal  standards  by  which  they  can  be  evaluated. 
The  pressure  on  public  pension  funds  to  invest  in  ETIs  or  invest  through 
government+ponsored  “bond  banks”  has  the  potential  to  cause  real 
damage  to  the  retirement  income  of  16  million  public  servants.  One 
recent  study  attempting  to  estimate  the  effect  of  such  pressures  estimated 
that  state  pension  funds  suffered  as  much  as  $5  billion  in  losses  between 
1985  and  1989  as  a  result  of  social  investment  statutes.59  The  pressure  on 
pension  funds,  and  these  losses,  would  quickly  disappear  if  pension  funds 
had  available  to  them  a  productive  outlet  for  investing  in  the  core  infm 
structure  of  their  communities  at  competitive  rates  of  return. 
The  concept  advanced  in  this  paper  authorizes  a  standard  financial 
instrument-state  and  municipal  bonds.  These  would  appeal  straightfor- 
wardly  to  pension  funds  by  virtue  of  good  credit  ratings  and  interest  pay- 
ments  above  Treasury  yields.  Pension  funds  could  participate  in  financ- 
ing  the  nation’s  infrastructure  needs  without  going  through  awkward  and 
risky  twists  and  turns  to  get  there.  The  availability  of  pension  fund 
resources,  along  with  the  assets  of  all  the  individuals  and  institutions 
that  normally  purchase  in  the  “taxable”  market,  will  provide  an  immedi- 
ate  and  deep  market  for  these  infrastructure  bonds. 
D.  Other Issues 
Limitaticms  on  BorrowinK  and Administration 
While  the  borrowing  practices  of  .some  states  would  permit  ready  adop- 
tion  of  this  program,  for  other  jurisdictions  it  may  not  be  so  easy.  Some 
states  have  a  constitutional  prohibition  against  borrowing,  and  others 
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require  voter  approval  for  certain  types  of  borrowing.  Nevertheless, 
municipal  bond  financing  occurs  in  all  states.  In  1992,  a  total  of  986 
bond  issues  worth  $22.5  billion  were  submitted  to  the  electorate,  and 
568  were  approved;  however,  a  total  of  12,709  longterm  debt  securities 
were  actually  issued,  worth  $235  hillion.m  Over  the  decade  1982  to  1992, 
municipal  bonds  involving  voter  approval  averaged  well  under  20  per- 
cent  of  the  dollar  volume  of  bonds  issued  annually.6* 
Administration  of  the  program,  allocation  across  states,  ehgibility 
requirements,  initial  project  se&ion,  and  other  issues  common  to  any 
government  grant-in-aid  program  would  be  resolved  during  the  develop- 
ment  of  legislation.  Needs  vary  greatly  across  states,  and  every  program 
involving  federal  reimbursements  must  address  the  distribution  and  allo- 
cation  of  funds  responsibly  and  equitably.  I  acknowledge  that,  while  ulti- 
mately  solutions  do  emerge,  political  realities  make  these  problems  very 
difficult  to  resolve.  Another  issue  involves  adjusting  for  variations  in 
credit  ratings,  which,  no  matter  how  intense  the  bidding  for  the  bonds, 
would  produce  some  slight  differences  in  interest  costs. 
I  am  recommending  a  pilot  project  because  of  the  uniqueness  of  the  pro- 
gram  and  its  financing.  This  will  allow  experimentation  and  time  to  work 
through  as  yet  unknown  obstacles.  It  will  also  afford  an  opportunity  to 
fine-tune  the  allocation  and  administrative  matters.  Of  course,  a  pilot  pro- 
gram  cannot  meet  the  full  range  of  state  and  local  infrastructure  needs. 
Easier  Access  to  the  Taxable  Ma&et 
Federal  laws  and  regulations  surround  the  tax-exempt  market  with  corn+ 
plex  rules.  They  strictly  limit  access  to  this  market  to  state  and  local  gov- 
ernments  and  their  agencies.  (This  is  only  logical,  given  that  tax-exempt 
bonds  represent  an  expensive  federal  subsidy.)  In  addition,  municipali- 
ties  are  constrained  by  provisions  of  fcdcral  tax  law  from  using  tax- 
exempt  debt  to  finance  infrastructure  projects  that  would  be  used,  at 
least  in  part,  by  private  institutions  for  private  activities6’  In  1989, 
requests  for  some  $2.4  billion  in  bonds  to  finance  solid  waste,  water,  and 
sewage  treatment  facilities  were  denied  or  delayed  because  of  these  limi- 
tations  on  private  activity  bonds.6’  The  much-touted  concepts  of  privati- 
zation  of  public  facilities  and  of  public-private  partnership  are  signifiw 
cantly  hobbled  by  these  legal  constraints.  However,  if  states  issue  taxable 
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bonds  that  do  not  subvert  federal  tax  collections,  then  the  private  sector 
would  be  free  to  join  in. 
Under  the  proposed  pilot  program,  some  types  of  activities  might  be 
acceptable  that  may  be  more  difficult  to  finance  under  current  condi- 
tions.  An  example  might  be  transit  station  renewal  programs,  such  as 
those  pioneered  by  New  Jersey  Transit  and  the  Project  for  Public 
Spaces,W  where  public-private  parmerships  could  be  developed  to  pro- 
vide  on-site  management  of  transit  stations  and  surrounding  areas. 
IV.  Souses  of  Funding 
A  key  question  in  proposing  this  program  is  where  the  money  should 
come  from,  both  at  the  federal  and  at  the  state  and  local  levels.  Each  is 
discussed  in  turn. 
Federal  Funding 
Federal  funding  for  this  program  is  a  decision  of  the  administration  and 
Congre+again,  a  difficult  one.  I  recommend  that  the  funds  come  from 
an  existing  program  dedicated  to  highway  expenditures  or  through  cuts 
in  programs  of  lesser  priority.  First,  the  Highway  Trust  Fund,  with  a  bal- 
ance  of  $21.1  billion  at  the  close  of  the  1992  fiscal  year,  allocates  and 
apportions  funds  to  states  for  highway  construction  and  related  purposes. 
While  most  of  the  fund  is  undoubtedly  dedicated  to  specific  construction 
projects  over  the  next  few  years,  maintenance  could  and  should  be  given 
a  high  priority  in  future  fund  spending. 
Second,  the  federal  share  of  this  program  could  come  from  cuts  in  enti- 
tlement  programs,  which  are  currently  the  subject  of  intense  scrutiny  in 
the  Congress.  I  recognize  that  this  is  politically  contentious,  but  I  also 
know  that  powerful  members  of  Congress  are  considering  cuts  in  these 
programs  for  further  deficit  reduction. 
The  spending  cuts  authorized  in  the  1993  Omnibus  Budget 
Reconciliation  Act  put  deficit  reduction  on  a  steady  track.  Projections 
for  the  deficit  are  showing  cvcn  sharper  decreases  than  expected.  The 
CBO  now  estimates  a  deficit  of  $162  billion  in  FY  1995,  down  from 
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Nevertheless,  feelings  persist  that  federal  spending  ought  to  be  pared 
back  still  further.  Numerous  proposals  to  cut  “discretionary”  spending 
have  been  put  forward,  but  many  members  of  Congress  believe  that  diss 
cretionary  programs  have  been  tapped  to  the  hilt.  Even  top  priorities  of 
the  Clinton  administration  are  being  severely  underfunded  as  a  result  of 
the  budget  tightening. 
What  remain  in  the  federal  budget  for  budget  cutters  to  tackle  are  the 
“entitlement”  programs-Medicare,  Medicaid,  Social  Security,  and  fed- 
eral  pensions.  At  54  percent  of  the  budget,  these  programs  represent  the 
most  substantial  store  of  potential  savings.  And,  indeed,  no  fewer  than 
three  ongoing  initiatives  are  taking  aim  at  reductions  in  entitlement  pro- 
grams.  The  Concord  Coalition,  headed  by  former  senators  Paul  Tsongas 
and  Warren  Rudman  (and  buttressed  by  Peter  Peterson’s  critically 
acclaimed  book  Facing  Up),  proposes  scaling  down  the  total  dollar 
amount  of  entitlements  eligible  individuals  receive  as  their  outside 
income  rises. 
A  second  proposal,  by  Senators  Sam  Nunn  and  Pete  Domenici,  would 
apply  caps  to  entitlement  programs  to  gradually  reduce  their  level  of 
spending.  A  third  effort,  the  Entitlement  Commission  established  by  the 
president  after  the  1993  deficit  reduction  battle,  is  chaired  by  Senators 
John  Danforth  and  Bob  Kerrey.  The  commission  issued  an  interim  report 
and  a  final  report  is  forthcoming  in  December  with  recommendations  for 
entitlement  program  cuts.  Cognizant  of  the  rising  pressure  to  cut  spend- 
ing,  congressional  leadership  has  publicly  pledged  to  tackle  caps  on 
spending,  limits  on  cost-of-living  increases,  and  reductions  of  benefits  to 
wealthier  individuals. 
The  movement  to  cut  entitlement  programs  is  beginning  to  take  on  a 
life  of  its  own.  So  it  is  reasonable  to  ask  the  question:  What  wiI1  be  done 
with  the  resulting  resources  ?  I  believe  that  relegating  the  funds  freed  up 
solely  to  reduce  the  budget  deficit  would  have  constricting  and  counter- 
productive  effects  on  the  economy.  Adapting  the  phrase  coined  by 
Robert  Shapiro  of  the  Progressive  Policy  Institute,  I  recommend  instead 
the  notion  of  “cut  and  invest.“w  Harking  back  to  the  original  plan  of  the 
Clinton  campaign,  the  idea  is  to  shift  the  federal  budget  away  from  its 
overemphasis  on  immediate  consumption  toward  a  more  balanced  mix- 
ture  of  consumption  and  investment.  In  this  approach,  some  of  the  sav- 
ings  from  entitlement  cuts  would  be  directed  toward  long-term  produc- 
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From  Consumption  to  Investment 
In  December  1992,  the  Levy  Institute  sponsored  a  critically  praised 
Fiting  Line  debate  on  deficit  spending,  pitting  a  team  led  by  William 
F.  Buckley,  Jr.,  against  one  led  by  Lester  Thurow  on  the  resolution: 
Reducing  the  National  Deficit  in  the  Next  Four  Years  Is  a  Top 
Priority. 
Thurow’s  team  praised  the  positive  aspects  of  deficit  spending,  while 
the  Buckley  team  accused  it  of  crippling  the  economy.  Nevertheless, 
both  teams  were  in  agreement  that  shifting  spending  from  consump- 
tion  purposes  to  investment  in  America’s  assets  would  go  a  long  way 
toward  solving  the  underlying  economic  prohlems  of  the  country. 
Thurow  offered  this  thought:  “What  WC really  ought  to  be  focusing 
on,  right  across  the  American  economy  .  .  .  is  how  do  we  ‘twist  the 
dials’  of  the  American  economy  so  investment  goes  up  and  consump 
tion  .  .  .  eventually  ends  up  being  a  smaller  part  of  the  total.”  The 
response  from  his  debating  opponent,  former  Senator  Warren 
Rudman:  “We  agree  on  that.” 
tive  investments,  with  an  emphasis  on  infrastructure;  of  course,  other 
savings  would  be  used  to  reduce  the  deficit. 
&ate  und  l.oca!  Funding  Sources 
Although  this  proposal  includes  federal  reimbursement  of  interest 
charges,  state  and  local  hond  issuers  would  still  bc  required  to  find  the 
money  to  pay  back  the  principal  on  the  honds.  As  any  fiscally  prudent 
official  will  admit,  bonds  are  a  financing  option,  not  a  revenue  source. 
How  will  this  proposal  heIp  states  and  localities  that  have  made  very  dif- 
ferent  political  choices  up  to  now  or  that  have  heen  unable  to  maintain 
their  infrastructure  properly  because  of  revenue  shortfalls? 
First,  not  every  state  or  locality  will  take  part  in  this  proposal.  This  is  a 
limited  pilot  program,  partly  to  elucidate  the  level  of  interest  of  states 
and  local  jurisdictions.  It  is  worth  noting  that,  with  the  marked  improve- 
ment  in  the  national  economy,  as  of  mid-1994  state  budgets  are  in  the 
best  financial  shape  in  years>7 
Second,  even  cities  with  serious  financial  difficulties  seem  able  to  pursue 
large  projects  such  as  new  sports  stadiums  or  convention  centers,  often A  Finmtcing  Plan  to  Eliminate  he  Deferred  Maintmance  on  the Natiun’s  Roads 
with  questionable  financing.  Where  the  will  exists,  the  revenue  seems 
forthcoming.  The  object  of  this  proposal  is  to  present  states  and  locali- 
ties  with  enough  incentive  to  find  the  necessary  revenues  to  do  what 
must  be  done. 
Third,  as  noted  earlier,  the  impetus  from  numerous  directions  is  leading 
many  localities  to  realize  that  they  must  begin  to  devote  attention  to 
neglected  maintenance.  This  proposal  saves  them  a  significant  part  of 
the  cost  and  produces  an  almost  immediate  economic  benefit  in  terms  of 
better  roads,  transit,  and  bridges. 
Finally,  it  should  be  pointed  out  that  there  is  a  slight  windfall  for  state 
and  local  governments  participating  in  this  program,  if  they  levy  an 
income  tax.  For  while  the  federal  government  would  fully  reimburse 
states  and  localities  for  their  interest  payments  on  the  bonds,  state  and 
local  governments  can  still  tax  the  interest  paid  to  resident  bondholders. 
For  example,  Missouri  has  a  6  percent  income  tax,  and  St.  Louis  a  I  per- 
cent  income  tax?’  If  a  St.  Louis  resident  were  to  purchase  a  Missouri  tax- 
able  infrastructure  bond,  the  city  would  receive  $1  and  the  state  $6  for 
every  $100  of  interest  paid  on  the  bonds. 
V.  Effects  on  the  Economy 
Recent  economic  trends  have  given  cause  for  considerable  encouragc- 
ment.  The  U.S.  economy  grew  at  a  4  percent  rate  during  1993. 
Productivity  recovered  from  a  low  of  0.8  percent  average  annual  growth 
rate  in  the  1980s  to  1.6  percent  in  1990-1993.G9  Net  private  investment 
is  beginning  to  expand  from  the  unprecedented  low  levels  of  the  early 
1990s.  Despite  signs  of  improvement,  a  large  program  of  infrastructure 
maintenance  and  upgrading  can  still  benefit  the  economy  by  creating 
jobs,  particularly  for  the  relatively  unskilled,  and  by  raising  productivity, 
thereby  contributing  to  long-term  economic  growth. 
The  current  economic  recovery  has  been  clouded  by  continuing  down- 
sizings  and  business  resn-ucturings  that  show  few  signs  of  abatement. 
With  over  8  million  peopIe  unemployed,  and  many  more  involuntarily 
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working  part-time,  questions  have  been  raised  about  the  ability  of  the 
economy  to  generate  sufficient  jobs  at  a  range  of  skill  levels  to  meet  the 
needs  of  the  American  work  force. 
Ohservers  of  the  U.S.  labor  market  are  heginning  to  note  a  split  between 
skilled  and  unskilled  workers  and  their  prospects  for  job  security. 
Secretary  of  Labor  Robert  Reich  noted  in  a  recent  article,  “the 
American  work  force  is  hecoming  divided.  Part  is  moving  very  rapidly 
into  a  world  of  new  work,  where  skills  and  flexibility  are  paramount.  .  .  . 
But  another  part  of  the  work  force,  anchored  to  outdated  structures  and 
styles  of  production,  is  being  left  behind.  .  .  .  Economic  statistics  com- 
bine  the  two  economies  and  obscure  the  distinction.  But  jobs  and 
incomes  in  the  two  economies  are  diverging.“rO 
Whether  or  not  a  heavy  emphasis  on  job  retraining  and  skills  develop- 
ment  will  suffice  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  relatively  unskilled  segment  of 
the  work  force,  public  investment  has  the  ahiliry  to  do  so.  Infmstructure 
maintenance  is  one  type  of  public  investment  that  not  only  creates  jobs 
immediately,  but  is  likely  to  create  jobs  for  the  relatively  unskilled.  One 
estimate  is  that  $1  hillion  spent  on  road  maintenance  will  generate  jobs 
for  25,000  people  directly  and  another  15,000  people  indirectly.”  New 
construction  puts  fewer  people  to  work  (although  at  higher  wages). 
According  to  one  study,  the  records  of  the  Port  Authority  of  New  York 
and  New  Jcrscy  show  that  “maintenance  employs  40  percent  more  work- 
ers  than  new  building  projects  or  major  reconstruction.“i2 
Productivity  und  Growth 
In  addition  to  jobs,  infrastructure  plays  a  vital  role  in  productivity 
advances.  Intuitively,  fixing  roads  and  bridges  means  less  axle  damage  to 
trucks,  fewer  road  mishaps  and  congestion,  lowered  cost  of  goods,  and 
increased  transportation  productivity.  Congested  and  deteriorated  high- 
ways,  broken  water  mains,  inadequate  sewage  treatment,  reduced  transit 
services-  all  of  these  infrastructure  deficiencies  reduce  productivity, 
drive  up  the  cost  of  goods  and  services,  and  inhibit  people’s  access  to 
employment.  Any  state  or  local  government  official  who  has  tried  to 
attract  business  facilities  to  a  particular  area  and  has  watched  business 
decision  makers  turn  up  their  noses  at  cracked  concrete  and  rusting 
hridges  knows  the  practical  meaning  of  those  statements. A  Financing  Plan to  Elimina  the Deferr&  LMain~nunce on  he  N&m’s  Rod 
While  common  sense  would  indicate  that  a  solid  infrastructure  aids  the 
economy,  quantifying  the  costs  of  infrastructure  deterioration  and  the 
benefits  of  its  revitalization  is  more  complex.  Some  studies  have  exam- 
ined  the  effect  of  pavement  conditions  on  the  operating  costs  of  a 
vehicle  (including  the  cost5  of  fuel,  oil,  tires,  maintenance,  repairs,  and 
depreciation).  For  example,  the  difference  between  a  “good”  pavement 
and  a  “poor”  pavement  could  mean  an  increase  of  from  24  to  42  percent 
in  the  costs  of  operating  an  automobile.i’  But  many  of  the  benefits  of 
improved  infrastructure  are  simply  not  accounted  for  in  standard  eco- 
nomic  measures.  Lower  commuting  times  would  benefit  workers  who  are 
currently  spending  an  estimated  11  percent  of  all  labor  force  work  hours 
on  the  highways.74  Other  costs  and  impacts-such  as  the  effects  of 
improved  infrastructure  on  congestion,  commuting  time,  and  business- 
related  travel  time-are  harder  to  determine  and  quantify. 
Statistical  modeling  of  the  role  of  infrastructure  in  spurring  economic 
output  has  been  the  subject  of  a  substantial  body  of  work  over  the  last 
five  years,  with  divergent  results.  Various  studies  have  estimated  the 
effects  of  increasing  the  value  of  the  nation’s  infrastructure  by  1.0  per- 
cent  on  total  national  output  (GDP)  as  ranging  from  0.02  percent  to 
0.44  pcrcent.is  Critics  have  charged  that  the  effects  estimated  in  these 
studies  depend  heavily  on  the  statistical  method  used,  the  data  base  con- 
sidered,  and  the  scope  of  the  regional  or  national  effects  analyzed. 
However,  even  critics  who  dismiss  any  linkage  between  infrastructure 
investment  and  private  sector  productivity  are  willing  to  concede  that  a 
program  of  infrastructure  maintenance  may  be  a  useful  economic  tool.76 
The  effect  wouId  not  necessarily  be  uniform  across  all  public  infrastruc- 
ture  programs.  But  well-selected  public  investments  in  infrasm~cmre  can 
play  an  important  role  in  furthering  economic  growth.  That  common- 
sense  understanding  is  supported  by  a  widely  reported  1988  study  by  the 
Congressional  Budget  Office  of  cost-benefit  studies  of  individual  trans- 
portation  projects.  The  CBO  estimated  that  investments  to  maintain  the 
current  quality  of  the  highway  system  would  have  provided  a  real  rate  of 
return  of  30  to  40  percent  as  a  national  average;  selective  expansion  of 
the  system  in  congested  urban  areas  would  have  yielded  returns  of  IO  to 
20  percent.Zi 
In  August  1994,  a  National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research  working 
paper,  “Infrastructure  and  Public  R&D  Investments  and  the  Growth  of 
The  Jerme  Levy  Economics  kwitute  of  Bad  Cofkge  4% Factor  Productivity  in  US  Manufacturing  Industries,”  reported  on  a  com- 
prehensive  analysis  that  examined  the  effects  of  publicly-financed  infra- 
structure  and  research  and  development  on  productivity  growth. 
Authors  M.  Ishaq  Nadiri  and  Theofanis  P.  Mamuneas  conclude  that 
although  the  measured  effects  on  productivity  vary  across  industries, 
“publicly  financed  [infrastructure]  capital  affects  industry  significantly.“” 
Critics  might  still  charge  that  a  large  program  of  public  investment  could 
“crowd  out”  private  investment,  since  both  types  of  investment  draw  on 
the  same  funds  available  in  the  economy.  Private  investment  is  believed 
to  have  a  more  direct  effect  on  spurring  economic  growth  than  public 
investment.  However,  Sharon  Erenburg,  at  the  Levy  Institute,  has 
recently  shown  that  the  “crowding  out”  effect  of  public  capital  spending 
on  private  sector  investment  is  outweighed  by  the  positive  “crowding  in” 
effects  of  public  investment.  Her  research  indicates  that  each  one  per- 
centage  point  increase  in  public  infrastructure  spending  would  yield  an 
estimated  0.6  percent  increase  in  private  sector  equipment  investment 
per  year  in  the  short  run  (and  0.4  percent  annual  increase  on  the  private 
side  over  the  long  run).  Her  findings  suggest  a  complementary  relation- 
ship  between  public  and  private  investment,  “with  additions  to  public 
capital  acting  as  a  catalyst  for  private  equipment  spending.“” 
Private  investment-particularly  on  equipment-has  been  identified  as 
one  of  the  most  important  and  direct  influences  on  productivity  and 
economic  growth.  J.  Bradford  DeLong  and  Lawrence  H.  Summers  have 
found  that  among  OECD  countries,  a  causal  relationship  between 
machinery  investment  and  economic  growth  exists:  higher  equipment 
investment  fuels  faster  growth.  Their  results  show  that  every  one  per- 
centage  point  of  GDP  investment  in  equipment  is  associated  with  a  one- 
third  percentage  point  increase  in  GDP  growth>@ 
The  recent  boost  in  private  equipment  investment  is  a  most  welcome 
development;  for  the  first  time  since  early  1990,  gross  private  fixed 
investment  exceeded  14  percent  of  GDP  in  the  fourth  quarter  of  1993, 
placing  it  back  in  the  normal  postwar  range.81  Nevertheless,  this  surge 
appears  to  be  responding  to  pentup  demand  for  new  technologies  and 
efficiency-improving  equipment  following  the  lingering  recession  of  the 
early  I99Os,  rather  than  an  increase  in  capacity  and  new  plant  in 
response  to  a  widespread  business  expansion.  Far  from  becoming  irrelee 
vant,  a  commitment  to  public  infrastructure  could  serve  as  a  catalyst  for 
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sustained  equipment  investment,  a  sure  harbinger  of  steadily  rising  levels 
of  productivity  and,  ultimately,  of  our  standard  of  living. 
VI.  Conclusion 
This  proposal  for  public  investment  in  infrastructure  can  help  both  to 
strengthen  prosperity  and  to  restore  existing  facilities  to  good  condition. 
As  a  nation,  we  have  always  placed  great  stock  in  the  efficacy  of  public 
investment,  through  a  long  history  of  building  harbors,  canals,  rails, 
roads,  and  water  and  sanitation  systems.  Underlying  this  proud  record 
was  the  public’s  belief  that  it  is  possible  to  make  investments  today  that 
will  build  a  better  tomorrow. 
Americans  understood  how  investment  in  the  public  sphere  was  not  so 
different  from  investing  in  our  own  households  and  businesses:  families, 
after  all,  set  up  <separate  savings  accounts  for  a  child’s  college  education; 
businesses  take  out  loans  to  pay  for  new  machinery.  We  believed  that 
the  purpose  of  long-term  investments  was  to  change  things  for  the  better 
for  the  next  generation-to  make  possible  sustained  growth,  improved 
productivity,  and  a  strengthened  private  sector. 
That  belief  has  been  severely  shaken,  but  not  destroyed.  The  surest  way 
to  achieve  better  jobs  and  a  stronger  economy  is  to  create  the  conditions 
for  business  investment  spending  and  productivity  improvements. 
Government  has  a  vital,  if  limited,  role  to  play  in  achieving  rhis  goal:  a 
program  to  quickly  upgrade  the  nation’s  infrastructure  that  will  lay  the 
basis  fm-  a  prosperous,  competitive  twenty-first  century. 
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APPENDIX A 
Inefficiencies  of  Tax-Exempt Financing 
The  tax  exemption  on  income  from  municipal  bonds  is  a  subsidy  to 
states  and  municipalities  provided  by  lowering  federal  tax  collections  on 
the  payments  to  bondholders.  The  inefficiencies  of  the  subsidy,  however, 
have  long  been  noted.  0ne  analyst  stated: 
Because  the  interest  rate  on  vax-exempt  hnnds  typically  must  be  suffi- 
ciently  generous  to  attract  investors  in  lower  tax  brackets,  purchasers of 
bonds  in  higher  r&x hrackcts  receive  higher  interest  rates  (larger  tax  sav- 
ings)  than  is necessary to  induce  them  to  buy tax-exempt  bonds.“’ 
To  illustrate  the  inefficiency,  assume  that  $100  billion  of  tax-exempt 
bonds  will  bc  issued  at  6  percent?’  Alternatively,  if  these  bonds  were 
taxable,  at  an  average  interest  rate  of  7.5  percent,  the  holders  would 
receive  $7.5  billion  in  interest.  Using  an  average  tax  rate  of  28  percent, 
the  federal  government  would  collect  $2.1  billion  in  tax  revenues  each 
year  (28  percent  tax  x  $7.5  billion).  Because  state  and  local  governments 
would  be  paying  7.5  percent  instead  of  6  percent,  they  would  be  losing 
$1.5  billion  per  year.  So  with  tax  exemption,  states  and  localities  get  a 
subsidy  of  $1.5  billion,  at  a  cost  (in  this  example)  to  the  federal  govem- 
ment  of  $2.1  billion,  40  percent  more!  I  estimate  that  from  1989  to  1993 
the  federal  government  lost  $22  billion  because  of  the  tax  exemption; 
states  and  localities  only  benefited  from  half  that  amount. 
This  is  not  the  only  problem  associated  with  tax  exemption.  Some  have 
suggested  that  by  lowering  the  cost  of  borrowing,  conceivably  the  federal 
government  provides  a  perverse  incentive  to  states  and  municipalities  to 
defer  maintenance  so  as  to  create  capital  projects.  If  they  had  to  borrow 
at  normal  rates,  they  might  be  more  diligent  at  maintaining  their  assets. 
Similarly,  one  writer  has  noted: 
By abspdining from the  taxation  of  interest  on  state  and  local  bonds,  the 
federal  government  buys down  the  rate  on  all  such  bonds.  In  such  an 
artificial  market,  there  is an  incentive  to  do  more  harrowing  than  a  free 
market  would countenance.H A  Financing Pkm  to  Eliminate the Deferred Maintenance  un rJte Narion’s Reds 
The  Congressional  Budget  Office  has  inveighed  against  the  practice  of 
permitting  tax-exempt  bonds  for  private  purpose  activities,  noting  that 
even  if  some  of  these  activities  merit  federal  support,  “tax+exempt 
financing  is  not  the  most  efficient  way  to  provide  assistance.“”  The 
0’s  concerns  are  twofold:  first,  that  the  benefit  being  provided  by  the 
federal  government  goes  not  just  to  the  borrower  but  to  the  investors  in 
the  bonds  as  well  and,  second,  that  “because  tax-exempt  financing  is  not 
a  budget  outlay,  the  Congress  may  not  routinely  review  it  as  part  of  the 
annual  budget  process.“86 
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APPENDIX  B 
Calculating  the  Federal  Share 
An  alternative  structure  of  principal  and  interest  payments  is  shown  in 
this  appendix.87  Tables  Bl  and  B2  show  payments  for  a  $10  billion  pilot 
program,  with  a  level  debt  service  arrangement.  With  “level  debt  ser- 
vice?”  the  total  debt  on  the  bond  paid  each  year  remains  the  same;  Table 
Bl  shows  this  arrangement  with  interest  payments  decreasing;  Table  B2 
shows  it  with  interest  payments  increasing.  Tables  B3  and  B4  show  the 
corresponding  schedules  for  a  $25  billion  program. 
Table Bl  Hypothetical  Principal  and  Interest  Payments  at  7.5%  Interest 
Rate,  $lOB  Piiot  Program,  Level  Debt  Service,  Interest  Decreasing  C?UOOs~ 
Year  Principal 
1  3U2,872 
2  411,588 
3  442,457 











5  511,314  621,558  1,132,872 
6  5499663  583,210  1,132,872 
7  590,888  541,985  1,132,872 
8  635,204  497,668  19132,872 
9  682,844  450,028  l,l32,872 
10  734,058  398,815  1,132,872 
11  789,112  343,577  1,132,872 
12  848,295  284,577  1,132,872 
13  911,918  220.955  1,132,872 
14  980,311  152,.561  1,132,872 
15  1,053,835  79,038  1,132,872 
Total  10,000,cQ0  6,993,085  16,993,085 
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Table  62  Hypothetical  Principal  and  Interest  Payments  at  7..5%  Interest 
Rate,  $lOB  Pilot  Program,  J_evel  Debt  Service,  Interest  Increasing  ($0005) 
Year  Principal  Interest  TOtal 
1  1,06 1,667  81,118  1,142,785 
2  986,307  156,478  1,142,785 
3  916,297  226,489  1,142,785 
4  851,2S5  291,530  1,142,785 
5  790,831  351,954  1,142,785 
6  7.349696  408,090  I, 142,785 
7  682,545  460,241  1,142,785 
8  634,096  508,689  1,142,785 
9  589,086  553,699  1,142,785 
10  547,271  595,514  I,  142,785 
11  508,424  634,361  1,142,785 
-  12  472,335  670,450  1,142,7t35 
13  438,807  703,978  1,142,785 
14  407,660  735,126  l,l42,785 
15  378,723  764,063  1,142,785 
‘-  Tml  10,000,000  7,141,780  17,141,780 
The  .jerrme  Levy  Ecommics  instita  of Bud  College  5  1 Table  63  Hypothetical  Principal  and  Interest  Payments  at  7.5%  Interest 
Rate,  $2.5I3  Pilot  Program,  Level  Debt  Service,  Interest  Decreasing  ($000~) 
YlZir  Principal 
1  957,lSl 
2  1 ,Q2S,969 
3  1,106,l42 
4  l,lS9,103 
5  1.27S,2S6 
6  1,374,157 
7  1,477,219 
S  l,SS8,OlO 
Interest  Total 
1 ,S75,cO@  2.S32?lSl 
l,SO3,211  2,S32,lSl 
1,726,039  2,S32,lSl 
1,643,07s  2,S32,lSl 
l,553,S95  2832,lSl 
1,45s,oz4  2.S32,lSl 
1,354,962  2,S3Z,lSl 
1,244,171  2,S32,lSl 
9  1,707,lll  1,125,070  2,S32,lSl 
10  l,S35,144  997,@37  2832,lSl 
11  1,972,7SO  s59,401  2J332,lSl 
12  2,120,739  7117442  2,X32,lSl 
I3  2,279,794  552.3S7  2,S32,181 
14  2,450,779  3Sl,402  2,832,lSl 
15  2.634.5S7  197,594  2$332,lSl 
Total  25,@00,000  17,4S2,714  42.4S2.714 
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Table  B4  Hypothetical  Principal  and  Interest  Payments  at  ‘7.~0  Interest 
Rate,  $25B  Pilot  Program,  Level  Debt  Service,  Interest  Increasing  ($000~) 
Yt?iU  Principal  Interest  Total 
1  2,654,168  202,79S  2,8.56.963 
2  2,465,768  391,195  2,8S6,963 
3  2,290,741  566,222  2,856,963 
4  2,128,138  728,825  2,856,963 
5  1,977,077  879,8U6  23856,963 
6  19836,739  1,020,225  2q856.963 
7  1,706,362  1,150,601  2,856,963 
-  -  8  1,585,240  1,271,723  2,856,963 
9  1,472,715  I  ,384,248  2,856,963 
10  1,368,178 
11  l,271,061 
12  1,180,838 
13  1,097,018 
1,488,785  2,856,963 
1,585,902  2,8S6,963 
1,676,126  2,856,963 
1,759,945  2,856,963 
14  1,019,149  1,837,814  23856,963 
15  946,807  1,910,156  2,856,963 
Total  2  5,CC10,000  17,854,450  42,854,450 
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